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INTRODUCTION 
 
Motivation 
The outset of this paper is a general concern of the status of the moral environment in 
today‟s Western world. One source for this is all the little things in everyday life that has 
made me wonder such as, the way we still have to deal with cleaning up after people littering 
society with their garbage on streets, in parks and such; people playing loud music in busses 
and trains seemingly without ever considering whether it might disturb others. The fact that 
more and more of the elderly is more or less abandoned in their last years and ends up living 
and dying alone. Stories of traffic accidents where more people than what can be excused for 
decide to speed away as if nothing had happened. 
 
On a different level other recent events in the world have further supported this belief. The 
financial crisis that hit in late 2008 was in large part a consequence of the excessive greed of 
especially the people at Wall Street who demonstrated (and continue to do so) a remarkable 
indifference to the consequences of their actions
1
. The continued lack of taking 
responsibility for the ecology of the planet is another example which is treated by politicians 
as another matter of „getting the best deal possible‟ – with less concern for the seriousness of 
the matter under discussion. Where does this indifference and cynicism come from? How 
can people become so preoccupied with getting what they want that they can ignore how 
their actions and doings are having a severely negative impact on lives of billions of people 
across the world? 
The right not to care? 
Another recent but very different event that show similar signs of indifference to the interests 
of others, was the controversial crisis of the „Mohammed drawings‟. This was what let me 
on the way for what I will focus on here. This event stands as a showcase example of two 
things. Firstly, how the language of rights seem to trump any other concern and also the fact 
that not everyone may place similar significance to these „universal rights that people do in 
                                                          
1
 Naturally other factors contributed heavily in bringing this situation about – the most important of which 
being a lack of control with the capitalistic system). 
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the West. The drawings were made in the name of the right of free speech and free 
expression which to the creator of the drawings meant a right to make these drawings and a 
similarly a right to disregard the fact that the content expressed might offend other people. 
The drawings had exactly this reaction and resulted in offending a whole religious culture 
which led to massive demonstrations throughout mainly the Middle-east where embassies 
were burnt to the ground and the Danish flags likewise set on fire by angry mobs. 
Additionally the man responsible for the drawings was by some celebrated as a hero since it 
was a shared view that the right of free speech is a human right and therefore to be treated 
almost as sacred; far over-trumping religious sentiments and prescriptions that state, that the 
prophet Mohammed may not be depicted. 
 
This incidence puts into question this basic idea of rights, since if our rights and the rights of 
others are largely what set the criteria for what it is and it is not morally permissible to do, 
something seems to be missing. For what happened with being under responsibility for your 
doings and about showing concern and respect for the interests of others? Logically rights 
imply certain corresponding duties but the talk of duties seem to have been forgotten in 
recent times
2
. In effect a culture has been created which is more concerned with what can be 
demanded and what one is entitled to than what is required of everyone in order to contribute 
to the well-being of society and its members. If this rights-discourse is unilaterally concerned 
with rights and neglects the principle of duty it can be questioned if the West has become 
unbalanced in between the two poles of rights and duties. I wish to explore further what it 
means to possess rights and how Western culture and society has been shaped morally by 
thinking in rights.  
Rights talk  
This is at least so from the point of view of several authors (Mary Ann Glendon in Rights 
Talk, David Selbourne in The Principle of Duty, Amitai Etzioni in The Spirit of Community, 
Henry Rosemont Jr. in A Bill of Worries) who have commented on how this rights-discourse 
has penetrated Western society and has become dominating in setting the moral standards of 
society.   
                                                          
2
  David Selbourne has argued for this in depth in his The Principle of Duty”. 
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According to this position the general support for rights and in particular the human rights, 
has had an impact in how our moral culture has been shaped and has further developed – 
especially in the years since WW2.  
 
In celebrating the invention of rights, (and in particular human rights) rights has become a 
domesticated and a very familiar concept whose value is generally taken for granted and 
rarely contested. Because of this people in the West often raise some eyebrows and get 
suspicious if anyone questions the value of rights. This appears to me to be an additional 
incentive for undertaking this endeavour. Henry Rosemont Jr. is however one who shares 
this view: “Just as one can be sceptical of Christian theology  without endorsing old scratch, 
so too, I believe, one can be sceptical of a rights-based conceptual framework,…, without 
giving any aid or comfort to the Hussein‟s, Milosevic‟s or Li Peng‟s of this world” 
(Rosemont, 2009, 53.54).  
 
The high esteem that is generally placed on rights is not without any substance either. Rights 
and especially the human rights have been celebrated as one of the big achievements of 
humanity – as what has come to finally recognize the substantial value of any human being. 
Rights are the last line of defence against tyranny for the oppressed and what according to 
Joel Feinberg enables people „”to stand up like men”, to look others in the eye and to feel in 
some fundamental way the equal of anyone‟ (Ihara, 21). Having rights gives a man the 
chance to protest and appeal when his most basic liberties and his dignity are violated. It 
gives everyone a chance to be heard and to say his opinion.  
This generally popular view of rights as what secure the basic value and dignity of every 
human being is hard to argue against and probably should not be argued against. In order to 
eradicate any possible confusion at this point let me make it clear that I do not dismiss that 
rights do indeed carry these qualities. Nor do I believe that rights are „bad‟ in any sense of 
the term or any other indication that goes against the view that rights viewed as such are 
undeniably of great value. My worry is however that the success of the concept of rights in 
consequence has become its own worst enemy in the sense that rights have entered into 
certain realms of public life and debate where they might not be very suitable and had thus 
had an influence on ways of thinking about moral issues and responsibilities for other people 
in Western society.  
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As it might be guessed at this point the critical view on these aspects of rights are at the same 
time also critical about several of the values central to liberalism – especially those 
concerned with individualism and with (the relentless aim of maximizing) liberty for 
everyone. It is hard to talk about rights without also talking liberal values since the idea of 
rights is based on the idea of the free and liberal human being. 
I believe it to be worthwhile to look into a (from a Western perspective) foreign ethical 
tradition where the balance between rights and duties have been markedly different and 
where very different mechanisms were used in order to govern the behaviour of individuals. 
Confucianism? 
One may ask oneself of what particular use it could be to look into the ancient Chinese 
philosophical tradition, Confucianism? I believe that the most comprehensive way of 
revealing one's taken-for-granted ideas about a certain thing is to show a contrasting picture 
where a certain practise or phenomenon is perceived under different circumstances. 
Confucianism conceived as a socio-political ethics is directed towards promoting a vision of 
society where people act towards one another through compassion and benevolence by 
cultivating moral sentiments in people without using coercive measures. The thought is that 
if you seek to build people's characters morally it is not necessary to govern society by rights 
and laws to the extent it is done in the West
3
.  
 
At the basis of Confucian ethics is the thought that if left to himself without guidance or 
direction a person will in time become selfish, possessive and self-centred. In order to 
achieve harmony
4
 in society (the ultimate goal in Confucianism) people has therefore to be 
led and directed; they have to be reminded of each other‟s humanity and what is required of 
oneself in order for harmony to prevail.  
 
Confucianism is a tradition that is very socially oriented, where people are not seen as 
individuals but as living in multiple relations to other people. These relations consist in 
                                                          
3
 The understanding here of Confucianism is portrayed in a positive light with focus on its positive sides by 
mainly Western authors such as: Tu Weiming, William Theodore de Bary, Roger Ames and Daniel A. Bell) 
4
 See appendix 1.2 for an explanation of  The Three Ultimates: the Way dao, Heaven tian and harmony he. 
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responsibilities between the two parties that are always mutual, always binding but rarely 
equal and never a matter of choice. 
This implies that Confucianism is based on very different values that most often do not 
resonate well in typical Western-liberal ears. Social in-equality is a basic principle of 
Confucianism which has been the main target for the critics. Confucianism is similarly at 
odds with certain core values held especially by many Westerns who consider the 
maximization of freedom and autonomy intrinsic goods for the individual. As a consequence 
Confucianism has been accused of being elitist, conservative and overly coercive in 
controlling human behaviour
5
. This has led some to believe that Confucianism has outplayed 
its role long time ago. 
These are naturally serious issues that require serious attention since applying equal worth to 
all human beings and treating everyone the same in many ways stand out as one of the 
greatest humanistic achievements of Western civilization. Replacing these with anything else 
would seem at the least, irresponsible. On the other hand it would be equally blind-sided to 
believe that we now have reached a point where our values signify „the best that we can 
possibly get‟. The contemporary ethos of rights in the Western world should be questioned 
just as past societal paradigms have been put the test to the past. 
Confucianism stands in this regard as a tradition that could provide as a useful resource for 
changing the direction of Western society towards an ethics of responsibility. 
 
It does not, however, have to be a matter of choosing one over the other, choosing rights 
over duties or vice versa. When considered in isolation the two perspectives are not 
necessarily mutually excluding, but could perhaps be complimentary. But it does seem, 
however, to be a matter of perspective, of what is considered as primary: Rights or duties? 
What are we entitled to claim and what are we required to do?   
Analytical framework 
The main theoretical frame of the project is comparative ethics and the object is a dichotomy 
between Western society and Confucianism here conceptualized as embodying two very 
different approaches to governing human behaviour in society and consequently also 
different views on what should be the aim of doing so. There are two objects of analysis in 
                                                          
5
  Especially Randall Peerenboom and Daniel W. Y. Kwok are representatives for these critiques. 
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this project. One of these is here broadly defined as „Western society‟. By this concept I 
include those parts of the world that can be considered to be (1) economically highly 
developed (relatively), (2) capitalistic, (3) informed by libertarian values, (4) stable 
democracies. The specific countries in mind are more or less made up by the countries on the 
continents of: North-America, Europe and Australia (incl. New Zealand). 
The other object of analysis is Confucianism which in this framework is perceived as an 
ethical tradition that once worked as a model for governing society. The relation between 
these objects is such that Western society is the analytical object of reference as it is here, 
where there is perceived to be a problem. Confucianism is an analytical resource in its 
capacity to provide a contrasting viewpoint and ideas for how to think society, individual 
and morality together in different ways and so provide as an inspirational „mirror‟ for 
Western society. 
Naturally Western society and Confucianism ethics and not only conceptually different from 
each other. They are also separated both idealistically, culturally, and not the least – through 
hundreds
6
 of years in time which naturally makes direct comparative study difficult. What 
makes a comparative study possible is that Confucian ethics present a complete model for 
society which, when has been described and analysed, can be compared to Western society. 
This is why this analysis will be taken in parts by treating each object of analysis separately 
and present findings subsequently thereafter.  
Having studied Confucianism in detail for some time I have come to find it necessary to 
present a relatively thorough account of what Confucianism actually is and how it served as 
a model for a society in order to give a fuller understanding of Confucian socio-politics and 
ethics. Confucianism is culturally very distant from at least this author‟s cultural frame of 
reference which presents serious epistemic challenges. Attempts in understanding a complete 
model for society perceived through culturally foreign terms will fail if bracketed into 
concepts that merely fit one‟s own epistemic categorization. Confucianism is additionally 
holistic in its view of the individual, society and the world and the tradition as a whole 
serves as inspiration in its own right.  
 
In the treatment of the perceived decline of morality in Western society the focus will be on 
two factors: rights; which will be conceived of as both a legal and a normative concept that 
                                                          
6
  All depending on how far one would consider it necessary to go back in time to find a society that would 
considered authentically Confucian. 
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set rules and boundaries for how people can behave and interact and also constitute a 
morality for what is considered rightful and wrongful behaviour. Rights will furthermore 
also be conceived as discourse that has come to influence on political and argumentative 
discourse I Western society. Community; considered as a concept that in certain ways is 
claimed to have an impact on how people in Western society behave morally. The definition 
of the concept will be discussed in the analysis.  
Delimitation 
I am aware that other factors also are determinant in setting the moral course on Western 
society such as how especially economic factors and capitalism as the economic paradigm 
have steered society in a certain direction and have had an impact by leaving lasting changes 
that undoubtedly have had an impact on morality. I will only include such factors 
sporadically in the project such as in considerations over society‟s transition from 
Gemeinschaft to Gesellschaft
7
. 
Although it is not a specific focus of the project to criticise the ideology of liberalism, as 
such, it is impossible to avoid doing so in a criticism of rights since rights are based on 
liberal ideals. Liberalism is thus irreducibly „part of the problem‟ and will therefore be 
criticised as such throughout the project. 
 
A delimitation for the analysis of Confucianism is a consideration on the relation between 
the normative view of the authors on Confucianism and their cultural origin – coarsely 
defined as either „Eastern‟ or „Western‟. This would be interesting as there seems to be a 
certain asymmetry here. I have chosen not to engage in this as it would broaden too much the 
scope of the project. 
One flaw in the analysis of Confucianism is a lack of material covering facts of what impact 
the Confucian form of government actually had on society; whether or not the idea of 
Confucianism actually worked according to the intent. On some points there appears to be a 
noticeable difference as to what were the thoughts and intentions of Confucius et al. and 
what seemed to be the reality in the Confucian inspired society. This imbalance could be 
analysed more thoroughly. This would however change the direction of the chapter 
substantially as it would close the analysis more around itself. As a compromise I am 
covering both the more positive and the more negative interpretations of the tradition. 
                                                          
7
 See pg. 19 
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Problem statement 
It is my interest to explore the concept of responsibility, in the sense of „an awareness of the 
impact of one‟s actions and in-actions on the rest of society‟. It is my belief in general that 
the Western world is imbalanced in how the average citizen considers the extension of the 
rights he enjoys and what consequently can be expected of him regarding responsibilities to 
co-citizens and to society in general.  
 
I wish to support this assumption by approaching the concepts of rights and responsibility in 
three different ways:  
 
Sociologically, through an investigation from within Western society, of the sociology of 
rights and, a claimed concomitant decline in the sense of responsibility. This perspective will 
identify what causes have contributed to this development and how rights as a discourse and 
a claimed „corrosion of communities‟ have contributed actively in inhibiting people‟s senses 
of responsibility. I will investigate this empirically by analysing the claims of Mary Ann 
Glendon in her Rights Talk: The impoverishment of political discourse and Amitai Etzioni in 
his The spirit of Community: Rights responsibilities and the communitarian agenda. I will 
specifically consider the claims that rights have developed into a discourse of its own which 
has had the effect that Westerners in general have a reduced sense of responsibility. Also I 
will consider the claim that there has been a development on the West causing a certain 
„corrosion of communities‟ which also have had an effect in how people feel a „a sense of 
responsibility‟. 
 
Culturally, by looking into Confucianism as a non-Western ethical tradition one can gain an 
insight into different ways of organizing and governing a society where the weight is rather 
on the fulfilment of duties than on ascribing rights. The recent renewed interest in 
Confucianism has let some authors to consider Confucian ethics and politics as being of 
possible interest to Western society where, some claim, morality and litigiousness is in 
decay. These authors include Daniel, A. Bell, Henry Rosemont Jr. and Wejen Chang. I will 
enter into these discussions in the light of my findings from the previous analysis and 
consider the reasonableness of the views.  
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Philosophically, through an examination of the concepts of rights and duties which will be 
related to the notion of justice on one side and the notion of virtue on the other. By loosely 
identifying The West as a society of justice and Confucianism as an ethical tradition based 
on virtue, the limitations to each perspective will be identified and the possibility of 
integration between the two will be examined. This approach will be based on Onora 
O‟Neill‟s “Towards justice and virtue: A philosophical account of practical reasoning”. I 
will follow O‟Neill in her considerations on identifying principles of required ethical action 
that go beyond the bounds of justice. This will illustrate the significance of viewing either 
agency or recipiency as ethically primary and point out where a term of „a sense of 
responsibility‟ fits in, in an account of ethical consideration. 
 
My working phrase is henceforth: 
I wish to investigate if there is a certain imbalance as to how people in the Western 
world, in general, consider what responsibilities they owe to the rest of society in return 
of enjoying certain rights. This perceived imbalance will be relativized against a 
different model of governing society (Confucianism) and against a principle of required 
ethical consideration established by Onora O’Neill.  
 
This claim will be investigated trilaterally from perspectives of, respectively: Confucianism, 
(Western) sociology and philosophy. To each perspective is connected a question to give 
direction to the analysis: 
1. In what ways have rights and a claimed „corrosion of communities‟ each been 
contributing factors for diminishing a sense of responsibility in people in Western 
society?  
2. How would Confucianism respond to the purported problems endemic to governing 
society and social behaviour primarily with rights? 
3. What are according Onora O‟Neill the bounds of required ethical consideration that 
goes beyond the bounds of justice in her integrated account of justice and virtue? 
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Methodology  
Sociological approach 
My fundamental claim of there being ‟a moral deficit‟ in some sense in the Western world 
rests on an empirical assumption about a certain development that has taken place in the 
United States the past 50-60 years. The specific focus on the United States is a required 
fixation due to the theoretical decisions. The best descriptions of this development that I 
wish to investigate are to my knowledge those by Mary Ann Glendon and Amitai Etzioni. 
This choice of authors have however some theoretical and methodological consequences for 
the project.  
One crucial methodological point is that Glendon and Etzioni both are Americans and write 
specifically within an American context. The rights movement have traditionally been 
stronger in the States than it is has been elsewhere in the Western world and the concomitant 
rights dialect is equally sharper and more far reaching in the States
8
. This explicit focus on 
developments in the States challenges the broader Western society/Confucianism dichotomy 
which is the elementary frame of the project. A certain development that takes place in the 
States is naturally not representative for the whole Western world in general
9
.  
I will however stay with the working definitions of „Western society‟ and „Confucianism‟ 
throughout the project because although it appears that this rights dialect has manifested 
itself much more vigorously in the States than in Europe this does not imply that rights have 
not had a similar (but perhaps slighter) effect in Europe and in other parts of the Western 
world. Although Glendon explicitly separates the developments in Europe and in the States I 
believe that any differences between the two cases will merely be a matter of degree. This 
assumption is based on the fact that basically any Western society today is based around the 
same (or at least similar) liberal values that constitute the basis for having a society based on 
rights and laws, people will be conditioned in similar ways but perhaps to varying degrees 
according to cultural, social and perhaps legislative variations between different societies. 
The point being, that living in a society controlled and governed by rights and laws that are 
derived from liberal ideals will in any case make a certain effect on the moral dispositions of 
the citizens. To reiterate - my interest is to identify any possible ill effects on the moral 
                                                          
8
  Glendon distinguishes the uniqueness of what she calls the American rights dialect and how it historically 
became distinct from the European counterpart, in chapter two in Rights Talk.) 
9
  This is especially so since Glendon has pointed out that the rights dialect developed differently in the States 
than elsewhere) 
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dispositions of individuals living in Western societies as a result of being conditioned to 
think morality in terms of laws and rights. I do however acknowledge that some of the 
examples used might be rather typical examples of a somewhat more particular American 
rights dialect and might not be representative for other parts of the Western world. These are 
however only illustrations of a phenomenon and as such are not at odds with the general 
conclusions of the analysis.  
 
Theory of science 
I will treat Glendon and Etzioni‟s claims as the empirical foundation of the project. The 
analysis will be based on identifying what are exactly the claims for this development and 
with what documentation and arguments are these claims supported. The arguments will be 
critically analysed by philosophical reasoning to verify if the arguments are consistent and if 
necessary further documentation will be included in order to verify the validity of the claims.      
The political viewpoint of the two authors is also of importance here. Both Glendon and 
Etzioni write from the theoretical position Communitarianism. Communitarianism is a 
political position that is based around certain so called Communitarian values. These values 
can be viewed as reactions to certain aspects of liberalism that the Communitarians believe 
need to be balanced with opposing values. These include (but are not exhausted by): focus 
on responsibility rather than on rights, communities as the essential way of creating a 
functional civic society, the nuclear family as the basic social unit in society, the fulfilment 
of civic duties, less state control (depends however on the fulfilment of these civic duties) 
etc. Communitarians are specifically anti-universalistic as they believe that traditions and 
local norms may be better suited at governing and legislating behaviour than principles of 
supposed universal applicability, such as rights for instance (Bell, Stanford Encyclopaedia). 
Although this explicitly normative view of the authors invites for criticism from a liberal 
viewpoint this is not what is the aim of the analysis. The reason for choosing a viewpoint 
informed by Communitarianism is that certain aspects of the Communitarian agenda are 
quite similar to the aim of this study. This means in effect that if some of the arguments of 
Communitarianism can stand scrutiny –  then the further analysis can continue and the 
project go on.  
I want however to remark that I do not write in favour of Communitarianism as a politics nor 
as an ideology. My own thoughts and possible sympathies for Communitarianism are not 
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relevant here and I treat the accounts given by these authors purely as claims that require 
analysis in order to for the purported problems of rights and responsibility in Western liberal 
democracies.  
 
Cultural approach 
Confucianism being a non-occidental tradition has the implication that occidental derived 
conceptual frameworks, such as my own, will have a challenge in capturing the epistemic 
basis of a tradition as Confucianism. This is an aspect to point out since many 
misunderstandings and premature judgements may be avoided if one keeps this in mind. I 
will follow Henry Rosemont and his methodology in his essay Whose democrazy?, whose 
rights? (Rosemont 2004) which is conveniently arguing much along the same lines as the 
present project. Rosemont points in this article to the most crucial aspects in this regard. 
Most importantly is the lack of the basic vocabulary needed for discussing political issues 
(from a liberal-democratic background, that is) such as rights
10
, democracy, justice, 
autonomy, choice, private, public, dilemma, ought and obligatory. According to Rosemont 
these concepts simply does not exist in Confucian discourse. This can be said to offer either 
one of the following two conclusions. Either this foreign tradition have not discussed ethics 
and politics in any serious or useful way, or it gives a hint that the Western way of 
discussing politics and moral matters is but one out of many ways. Most Westerners would 
find it practically impossible to engage in serious discussion without the use of such central 
terms but this does not necessarily mean that it therefore is not possible. In order to look at a 
tradition as Confucianism one has to render oneself critical to many taken-for-granted 
notions about how we in the West have come to perceive the individual as free and 
autonomous and how human rights are helpful moral tools that secure first and foremost 
these two concepts. Other traditions may not view the individual quite as free and 
autonomous as we do in the West and they may not share the belief that the promotion of 
these is of in-questionable importance in shaping a body politic for a society (ibid).  
In a similar vein the style of writing are also very dissimilar where in the West analytical 
philosophy is supposed to follow what Rosemont terms a 'hypothetico-deductive, adversarial 
                                                          
10
 It should be granted that it is a matter of controversy whether or not there is a term that share or can be 
said to sufficiently cover the meaning of 'rights'. This partakes in a particular viewpoint on Confucianism that 
will be treated later on. It does seem though that Rosemont is right when he insists that a single term that 
has a corresponding meaning to 'rights' does not exist in Confucianism. 
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style of discourse' (Ibid, 51) whereas classical Confucian texts not only are alien to this kind 
of formula but often carry a distinctive narrative tone to them where theory is often mixed 
with comments on current events and personal anecdotes (Ibid). Additionally Confucianism's 
essence (if one exists) is difficult to establish – especially for a Western mind-set – since it 
does not respect the Western taxonomy of the various academic disciplines. 
 
Theory of science 
The amount of contributions on comparative ethics where Confucianism is one viewpoint is 
rather generous. Most of this is regarding the confrontation of Confucianism and the human 
rights which has recently received a lot of attention. Major specialists in Confucianism are 
Daniel A. Bell, William Theodore de Bary and Tu Wei-ming who all have published 
material on the question of Confucianism and Human rights. I have made extensive use of an 
anthology by de Bary and Weiming with essays especially concerned with the different 
concerns regarding the meeting between Confucianism and the human rights. The high 
degree of specialization on this topic has meant that both the account of Confucianism and 
the following discussion of Confucianism and HR are done based on material with this 
particular focus. Although my aim is different these discussions have nonetheless proved 
very usable and relevant. First of all due to the matter at hand which is made up in the 
conceptual field of confined by rights, Western society (human rights are commonly viewed 
as a product of the West) and Confucianism. Secondly the comparative nature of this 
approach is also shared and some writers actually consider, in addition to considering how 
human rights could be grounded in Confucianism, also how elements from Confucianism 
can have relevance in the West. 
 
Generally questions here are concerned with either interpreting Confucianism in a certain 
way with the aim of either proving or disproving the prevalence of what is considered to be 
sufficiently similar early versions of the human rights. Sumner B. Twiss, Julia Ching and 
Irene Bloom argues each in their own way for how human rights can be interpreted from 
within Confucianism.  
Another set of authors with similar intentions do not find this endeavour plausible but find 
instead other points for inspiration that rather suggest a symbiosis of Confucian and Western 
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moralities. Randall Peerenboom, Wejen Chang, Seung-hwan Lee and Chung-yien Cheng 
propose such points of views.  
Others again are very critical to the basic idea of rights and argue that a modernized version 
of Confucianism in many ways would be advantageous to a rights-based system. Despite this 
rather extreme point of view this usually gets modified to look more like the above 
suggestion where Confucianism adopts a more complimentary role to the Western rights-
based approach. The distaste of rights and their deleterious effects are however what 
dominate their position. Henry Rosemont Jr. and Craig K. Ihara argue for such points of 
view.  
I have made use mostly of material from the two last described groups. It has been here I 
have found material that additionally was concerned with looking towards the West from a 
Confucian-based point of view. The distribution of writers from Eastern and Western 
perspectives seem well-balanced throughout - although with a little gain of Western writers, 
judged from what the writers‟ names‟ indicate. 
General approach 
In answering this assumption and the three sub-questions in a comprehensive manner I have 
deemed it necessary to treat these one by one. This entails that structure of the thesis will 
divided into three areas and each conceptual strand will be treated independently. Although 
such an approach often has the consequence that the thesis might seem fractured as a whole 
due to a lack of cohesiveness. The idea of the project is however that each part will be the 
natural succession to the previous one. The hope is therefore that there will seem to be a 
natural progression between the parts.  
 
As my basic assumption rests on a presumed diminished „sense of responsibility‟ I will start 
out with putting this assumption to the test. I will follow two authors, Amitai Etzioni and 
Mary Ann Glendon who are largely supporters of this assumption. By identifying their main 
empirical arguments for supporting their convictions I will analyse these in a philosophical 
systematic manner and thereby see if there is hold to the claims. I will subsequently also 
analyse one normative argument which require consideration in isolation from the 
empirically based reasoning. 
In the following section on Confucianism I will relate my findings of the previous section to 
an account of the political program of Confucianism. This will be done by first carefully 
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present a thorough account of Confucian ethics with special emphasis on the social, political 
and moral aspects of this tradition. I will then look into some suggestions by other authors of 
how certain elements from Confucianism potentially could be of interest to the problems that 
the West is dealing with. 
In the last section I will identify what the relations are between rights and duties which will 
provide useful to understand an elementary difference between justice and virtue ethics. 
Henceforth I will follow English philosopher Onora O‟Neill in her account of integrating an 
account of justice and an account of virtue ethics. O‟Neill operates within a rather 
complicated framework between concepts of: justice and virtue, rights and duties and agency 
and recipiency. O‟Neill attempts to identify which principles of ethical consideration will 
come out of integrating justice and virtue. The approach will be systematic philosophical and 
will be based on the approach taken by philosopher O‟Neill herself. This account is be based 
on ethical requirements and will so incorporate elements from both justice defined by what is 
just and from virtue defined by what should I do? O‟Neill‟s approach is naturally of great 
relevance to the aim of this project and I will consider its reasonability in relation to my 
previous findings. 
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The decline of morality in the Western world 
 
In this section I wish to investigate certain claims that are concerned with the current state of 
Western civic morality from three specific areas each which are: Rights, 
responsibilities/duties and community. Throughout the last 50-60 years changes have 
occurred regarding how Western societies position themselves within the spheres of these 
concepts; furthermore, it is believed by certain authors that they have had an effect on 'the 
average Western citizen's sense of responsibility towards his surroundings'
11
. 
I will base this analysis on two specific works by two authors who treat these concerns in 
quite different ways but with similar political intentions. One is Amitai Etzioni whose The 
Spirit of Community: Rights, Responsibilities and the Communitarian Agenda I make use of 
here, and the other is Mary Ann Glendon and her Rights talk: The impoverishment of 
Political Discourse.  
I have identified one main thesis that I believe both Glendon and Etzioni wish to defend. It 
can also be said to be a claim of the Communitarian position in general. In support of this 
claim I have found two arguments that the two authors use as justification for this claim. My 
approach to this is then to analyse these two arguments in a philosophical systematic manner 
to see if they hold as justification for the main thesis. 
 
The main thesis for both authors is: 
Certain developments in Western society have had the effect that people living in these 
societies have had their ‘sense of responsibility’ diminished12. 
What is meant by the term „sense of responsibility‟ is „an awareness and concern for the 
impact and the consequences of one‟s own actions and in-actions, for the general well-being 
of the wider society‟. This definition is my own and I will treat this as being a main thesis 
that both authors seek to defend. I will qualify this in the following.  
This claim is supported by two empirical observations
13
 and by one normative arguments. 
                                                          
11
 This notion will be qualified more precisely later on.  
12
 The term ‘sense of responsibility’ is actually Glendon’s which she uses on page xi. As I argue later she does 
not use it analytically or define it more carefully. My use of it is therefore an adoption that is done because I 
find it suitable for what I find central in both Etzioni and Glendon accounts and for my own purposes. I will 
furthermore use the term throughout the project as a reference that points in the direction of what I am 
searching for. 
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1) One cause for the postulated effect in the main thesis is a certain „corrosion of 
communities‟ characterised as being a certain way of living together. Most 
importantly, this has caused the loss of a self-sustaining communal „moral voice‟.  
 
2) Another cause is that rights have come to infiltrate society to such an extent that 
these have rooted out the traditional sense of responsibility and of civic obligation. 
This has caused a certain rights discourse to develop which has had a devastating 
effect on how people discuss what they believe they are entitled to and how they 
perceive the extension of their rights.  
 
In addition to this Glendon believes that a certain omission in American legislation 
has caused the further diminishing of this sense of responsibility.  
 
3) Related to this is the normative argument that people are confusing their rights with 
„rightness‟ which suggests that they equate having rights with having an ultimate 
right to use these, disregarding all other concerns. 
 
The first claim is mainly Etzioni‟s and it constitutes the main thesis in The spirit of 
community. Since his intent and approach is explicitly political the book is quite reader-
friendly and consequently not very heavy theoretically based. I am aware that writings with 
such a specific political profile and limited theoretical reasoning can be academically 
dubious. Etzioni‟s writing is however quite sober in this regard and provides a sufficiently 
supported account of the state of contemporary Western social morality. He gives an 
interesting perspective which is mainly a critique on the current state of (American) society 
with special emphasis on the current (anno 1995) state of morality, responsibilities and 
individualism. 
Corrosion of communities 
Etzioni delivers his argument in the form of a narrative, rather like a long speech, where he 
presents various observations about society that mainly revolve around the idea that 
Western/American society today has lost its way morally due to various empirical 
circumstances. Etzioni‟s main argument about this „loss of communities‟ is intuitively 
                                                                                                                                                                                   
13 It is not entirely correct to call these arguments empirical since Etzioni is not basing his claims on 
descriptive accounts of developments but rather on somewhat biased interpretations of state of affairs in the 
past and in the present which are being connected inductively. Etzioni’s empirical arguments are by other 
words not entirely empirical but quite affected by subjective idealization. This will become apparent in the 
analysis. 
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appealing since it is common knowledge that the ways of the Western world have gone 
steadily in favour of increased individualism, mobility and urbanization throughout the last 
50-60 years. In this sense the communities, in the traditional sense, where one knew and 
interacted with one‟s neighbours is not to be found to the same extent today where more than 
half of the world population live in big cities. Two things are however determining the 
validity of the thesis. It is first of all crucial what exactly is meant by the term „community‟. 
Many different kinds of social living arrangements can potentially be considered to be 
communities and as such „communities‟ are to be found everywhere at all times. Secondly it 
is a matter of opinion when it can be said that „a corrosion‟ has taken place and cannot be 
determined precisely. 
 
Although the term „community‟ is used frequently throughout, Etzioni fails to provide a 
precise definition and instead he usually refers to it as; „something shared‟ (p. 14), where 
people know one another, help one another, look after one another and most importantly, 
where a set of moral norms are in place to direct and correct social behaviour. One suspects 
that the lack of a precise formulation of „community‟ serves to highlight what Etzioni 
perceives to be the most important aspect of communities – the thriving of moral norms 
through the common efforts of the community-members. Daniel A. Bell
14
 has suggested 
viewing the concept of community instead as a normative ideal as he has also criticised the 
lack of definite explanation of the term. It is easy to reach the conclusion that Etzioni‟s ideal 
of community is to undo society to the way it was in the sixties, characterized by the 
husband being the sole family supplier and the wife consequently being a „house-wife‟ 
(Etzioni, 25). This is precisely the critique given by Ben Saul in an article from 2001. Saul 
believes that Etzioni's idealisation of communities of  the 1950s is rather a romanticization 
and he even questions if such a moral 'golden era', as he terms it, ever existed (Saul, 570)?  
In this sense Saul reads Etzioni as being a conservative who is rather suspicious of change in 
general. Saul suspects Etzioni of having lost faith in youth today because of the excesses of 
freedom, dutilessness and a lack of respect for authorities which is responsible for young 
people's carelessness towards drugs, sex and their duties toward society (Saul, 568-571). 
Etzioni does show an attitude of hopelessness towards the youth of today (1995) which 
makes him appear quite conservative and pessimistic: “Millions of teenagers see little 
                                                          
14
 Bell, Daniel, "Communitarianism", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2010 Edition), Edward N. 
Zalta (ed.) 
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meaning in life other than to have a child, without having a serious commitment to their 
infants” (Etzioni, 27). This pessimism could also serve as another explanation for Etzioni‟s 
constant references to the past and how things were better back then. 
 
As Saul rightly points out it is easy to perceive Etzioni as a conservative who became 
disgruntled after „the spiritual liberation of man‟ in the end of the 1960‟s. What Etzioni saw 
as an era of civility, genuine neighbourliness and moral uprightness was to Saul probably an 
era of frustration, claustrophobia and illiberalism. These are normative viewpoints that say 
nothing about matters of fact. In extension hereto I believe that Etzioni is not quite as 
conservative and backward-looking as Saul makes him appear. Etzioni clarifies that he does 
not wish to return to the communities as they existed in the 50‟ies. He believes that these 
communities were over authoritative and too constraining (Etzioni, 122). Secondly Etzioni 
not only admits that his thesis of the corrosion of communities only entails communities in 
the above-mentioned traditional sense but also affirms that communities in different shapes 
and forms do exist today. Etzioni refers to Herbert Gans, an American sociologist who 
observed that in big cities communities also existed and were reported to carry many of the 
same features as the more traditional communities and suburbs such as good 
neighbourliness, and a common concern for common areas and facilities (Etzioni, 120). 
Also, Etzioni talks about various kinds of communities such as work-based and professional 
communities (p. 121) urban, social initiatives such as the YMCA (Young Men‟s Christian 
Association) and the newer non-geographically based communities which, as we now see, 
have grown significantly since the publication of The Spirit of Community to become very 
influential with important developments such as Facebook and Twitter.  
 
One might sensibly ask then where is this alleged „corrosion‟ to be found? Although it seems 
that Etzioni has disproved his own claim Etzioni sticks with his claim about the corrosion of 
communities. Over a few pages he covers the development of what is now usually referred to 
as the transition from Gemeinschaft to Gesellschaft
15
.Etzioni believes that the modern era of 
                                                          
15
 A distinction between two different kinds of human association developed by the German sociologist 
Ferdinand Tönnies. Literally it means community and society and it was developed to explain the very 
different ways of human socialization as to when people lived rather in communities that were characterized 
through kinship, common mores and common beliefs and a certain ‘unity of will’ as Tönners described it. 
Gesellschaft is on the contrary characterized by people associating though similar self-interests and similar 
goals such as what you find in a modern business where people associate with the common purpose of 
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Gesellschaft for decades has been embraced rather blindly. The wonders of mass society and 
big cities where people were finally completely free to choose their fate was viewed 
unconditionally positively as progress and in contrast to Gemeinschaft which was viewed as 
something backwards that confined behaviour and so had to be overcome (Etzioni, 116-117). 
Etzioni mentions the process of modernization where people moved from the countryside 
and villages to big cities which were considered important in „setting people free‟ since little 
villages were considered as backward and claustrophobic places. However, when people 
started to be removed from villages where they had been working on farms and where there 
had been strong communities they were often moved to cities to work in factories and to 
suffer a more isolated way of life (Etzioni, 116 - 117). Etzioni also mentions how the free 
market system increasingly pushed for further individualization and that the development of 
the welfare state made people become more dependent on the state than on their human 
relations in times of need (Ibid). Etzioni believes that people in general looked at this 
development too uncritically and were blinded by the “bright shining science and 
technology” (Etzioni, 117). Etzioni seems a bit biased in making this assumption since what 
caused people to move from „their communities‟ to find their ideal life in the big city just as 
well was a question of needs to find jobs and make money. The process of industrialization, 
as is well known, forced many people to move to the cities. Either way the result stands the 
same. People were in either case moved from smaller communities into bigger anonymous 
urban areas where communities did not exist in the same sense.   
 
It is, however, not these sociological factors that are of the biggest interest to Etzioni. His 
interest is in the community as a concept and is specifically centred on its ability to provide 
and maintain a moral order of sorts through what he has termed „a moral voice‟. “Our focus 
here, though, is on another element of community, crucial for the issues at hand: 
Communities speak to us in moral voices. They lay claims on their members. Indeed, they 
are the most important sustaining source of moral voices other than the inner self” (Etzioni, 
31). The term „moral voice‟, just as with Etzioni‟s idea of a „community‟, is not clearly 
defined. Etzioni refers to various instances where other people from the same community 
brought attention to deviations from a moral code by gently giving hints to the action in 
                                                                                                                                                                                   
making money. These relationships are in effect usually less tight and less loyal than in the Gemeinschaft 
because of the lack of common mores. Source: Wikipedia, Gemeinshcaft and Gesellschaft, permanent link: 
//en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Gemeinschaft_and_Gesellschaft&oldid=450378186.    
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question. He mentions specifically how he himself was given a recommendation for „a good 
gardener‟ when he for some time had neglected his garden in an American suburb. It was 
considered important in this neighbourhood to keep up the appearance of the community to 
avoid declining property values (Etzioni, 33). In another example Etzioni explains how the 
residents in a cooperative building
16
 passed around memos to remind people to „sort their 
garbage‟ (Ibid). A „moral voice‟ thus seems to connote a shared morality of the community 
that directs people to pursue certain kinds of behaviour and to abstain from other kinds
17
.  
Etzioni‟s concern about the community is to be found in the ways that a community is able 
to provide a moral platform that can guide people to behave more responsibly towards each 
other and the society at large. Since Etzioni has admitted already that communities also exist 
today (although maybe not to the same extent or in the same form) one can suspect that what 
he believes has been „corroded‟ is not the existence of communities as such but rather the 
inherent morality that he believes are an integral  of these. Etzioni can then be said to believe 
that there exists a certain connection between the presence of a community and a 
concomitant development of a moral code that does not exist outside of this community on 
the same terms.  
 
Steven Brint has analysed the concept of communities in depth in an article
18
 where he looks 
at the research carried out in the past. In the article Brint identifies eight different types of 
communities by drawing a typology and  which consists of various variables such as: 
existential basis of relationship ties; primary reason for interaction; frequency of interaction 
and so on (Brint, 10). It should be safe to conclude that Etzioni‟s traditional community is of 
the kind where face-to-face interaction and geographical proximity is high. Brint terms these 
kinds of communities as “Small–scale communities of place, neighbourhood, and groups” 
                                                          
16
 Cooperative housing corporations where individuals or families work together to directly construct their 
own homes in cooperative fashion (www.wikipedia.org) 
17
 I am aware that this concept that Etzioni describes is highly normative and can easily be attacked for leading 
to a ‘moral police of a kind’. I am aware of this and the two examples above were chosen to show two 
different varieties and ‘degrees’ of phenomenon. Room does not allow me to discuss this normativity which 
forces me to have to settle to conclude somewhat dissatisfyingly that a moral voice can potentially be an 
effective means to keep up a moral environment but at the same it can easily become overly coercive and 
set demands too high causing uniformity and intolerance. This will be discussed in some detail in the 
following)   
18 Brint, Steven, Gemeinschaft revisited: A critique and reconstruction of the community concept, Sociological 
Theory 19:1 March 2001 © American Sociological Association. 1307 New York Avenue NW, Washington, DC 
20005-4701 
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(Brint, 10). Furthermore, it should be uncontroversial to say that Etzioni is right that these 
types of communities were a lot more predominant in the 1950‟ies and 60‟ies than they are 
today – at least in the Western world given the before-mentioned development that the 
Western world has undergone. 
In another typology, Brint then hypothesizes and ascribes certain virtues and vices to the 
different kinds of communities based on the available literature on communities. Although 
Brint does not include a particular category for „morality‟ or for tendencies towards „moral 
speech‟ he does include a category called Fraternalism and mutual support to which he 
ascribes, among others, the following features: “(1) as a prior predisposing factor, high levels 
of participation in community life; (2) the development of interpersonal obligations and 
practices of mutual support” (Brint, 14). I will not propose that these descriptions might have 
a similar meaning to Etzioni‟s „moral voice‟ but I will however suggest that a community 
where there are „high levels of participation in community life‟ and a community that is 
similarly characterised by „interpersonal obligations and practices of mutual support‟ is at 
least indicative of the prevalence of Etzioni‟s description of a moral voice, as I understand 
the term. A community characterised by people helping each other out and perform 
interpersonal obligations is a community that is concerned with the welfare of each other and 
therefore can be thought to have established a framework of moral norms in order to increase 
the general welfare of the community members. If this assumption has merit then Brint‟s 
study seems to provide support to Etzioni‟s claim about the moral voice. This can be shown 
in the following observation: “expectations for high levels of active participation and for 
responsiveness to interpersonal obligations are greater in communities involving continuous 
face-to-face contact. Only in these circumstances can group social control be exercised on 
inactive or irresponsible members. Therefore we should expect higher levels of participation 
and interpersonal obligation in communities of place” (Brint, 15).  
Throughout the article Brint makes additional references to the ability of these face-to-face 
communities to establish a moral order. In analysing Durkheim he noted: “Durkheim‟s 
conceptual approach was to see community not as a social structure or physical entity but as 
a set of variable properties of human interaction that could be found not only among 
tradition-bound peasants of small villages but also among the more sophisticated denizens of 
modern cities … Durkheim was impressed by the importance of community relations for 
equipping human beings with social support and moral sentiments” (Brint, 3).  
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Similarly, Brint also notices that communities that do develop such moral frameworks 
(which Brint occasionally describes rather negatively as „monitoring for conformity to group 
norms‟ (p. 19)) at the same time are also more inclined to ‟illiberalism and intolerance‟ 
(Brint, 19, 20). So even though there seems to be some truth in the idea that these kinds of 
traditional communities tend to come with systems of morality and higher degrees of 
fraternity and mutual support than other types of communities, the other side of the coin is 
that these communities are just as frequently characterised by inequality, struggles over 
power and conformism. On the contrary he found out that “friendship networks, activity-
based elective communities, non-ideological virtual communities are examples of 
communities in which they
19
 typically are not linked (Brint, 20).  
Although Brint does not engage in a discussion about how he estimates the condition of a 
moral voice in communities today he does propose an answer to the related controversy 
between liberalists and communitarians on the basic value of having communities. Brint 
accepts here both the case of the defenders of communitarianism and the critique from the 
liberalists (such as Saul, referred to above) in his final verdict of the traditional community. 
In acknowledging arguments from both sides he recognizes the possible value of 
communities but also asserts that these however come with a price.  
What Etzioni wishes is (naturally) to import all the positive aspects of the traditional 
communities, such as the moral voice, and leave all the other things (which coincidentally 
are those which the liberalists normally criticise in the communitarian agenda) behind 
(Brint). Etzioni‟s claim about the corrosion of communities (and so of morality) can then be 
said to be partially true. There are undoubtedly fewer of the communities that Etzioni has in 
mind today (or in 1995) and it is possible to ascribe to it a tendency to develop an 
environment of mutuality, reciprocity based in a normative framework that gratifies and 
restricts certain types of behaviour among the community members. At the same time there 
are certain negative consequences with these kinds of communities due to a higher tendency 
toward social stratification, inequality, illiberalism and intolerance. According to Brint, both 
the positive and negative sides are part of most of these kinds of communities. 
 
                                                          
19
 Relations between fraternity and illiberalism. 
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So where does this leave us? Since Etzioni appears to be rather reminiscent of the past in his 
view of communities and as is often the case in comparisons between present and past 
Etzioni has an idealized view about the past and about the reality of communities. The little 
space offered on the harmful sides to communities leaves an impression that this is not a 
representative picture of what it means to live in a community. A notice of warning is given 
but no careful treatment of this risk is to be found. The concept of a community is therefore 
at one and the same time able to create a communal atmosphere of solidarity and empathy 
which potentially can provide a moral climate but can in a similar fashion provide the 
grounds for gang-culture to take root as well as create a community that leads to extreme 
conformism and intolerance for both difference and for change.   
Rights infatuation 
One of Glendon's purposes in Rights talk is to defend the claim that rights have invaded 
Western society (in particular the United States) to an extent that it has developed into a 
discourse of its own as to how people argue and discuss politics in general. Additionally this 
new rights discourse has come to replace what Glendon calls „our traditional sense of 
responsibility‟ with the result of making people more careless about the welfare of other 
people and of society at large. I do not intend to analyse both of the two claims exposed 
above. I will focus on the latter claim suggesting that a discourse of rights has become so 
pervasive that the population's natural sense of their responsibilities has become corroded. 
Glendon herself expresses this claim as follows:  
“Rights talk itself is relatively impervious to the other more complex languages 
we still speak in less public contexts, but it seeps into them, carrying the rights 
mentality into spheres of American society where a sense of personal 
responsibility and of civic obligation traditionally have been nourished” and 
shortly after continues “...a near-aphasia concerning responsibilities makes it 
seem legitimate to accept the benefits of living in a democratic social welfare 
republic without assuming the corresponding personal responsibilities and civic 
obligations” (Glendon, x-xi). 
 
There are two aspects in this claim. First, that at an earlier time, which Glendon refers to as 
'traditionally', people had a stronger sense of responsibility, personal and civic; secondly, 
that a rights mentality has come to occupy this place to a given extent.  
Somewhat surprisingly, Glendon does not spend much time (if any at all) in explaining how 
people at some point in the past possessed a greater sense of responsibility nor does she 
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explain what is meant by „a sense of responsibility‟. Glendon's main occupation seems to be 
instead to render support to the view that today rights are everywhere and responsibilities are 
few and far between. One could assume that Glendon might take it for granted that there 
existed an earlier period where people had a higher sense of responsibility and so bases her 
own account on Etzioni‟s arguments, since they share a quite similar agenda. The disposition 
chosen here in this present study makes it reasonable to suggest that Etzioni‟s arguments can 
also apply for Glendon‟s claim. It is nonetheless problematic that Glendon leaves this claim 
unsupported. The central claim, once again, is that at an earlier stage people possessed in 
higher degree „a sense of responsibility‟ that has now been taken over/replaced by/with a 
certain rights mentality. 
 
First it has to be determined what is meant by the term „sense of responsibility‟ as this is a 
term that can suggest various things. Unfortunately, Glendon does not define more clearly 
what it means to have a sense of responsibility. Initially it seems obvious that the term is 
normatively counterpoised to the term „rights mentality‟ where the former represents an 
ideal, and the latter a perversion of this ideal. The word „traditionally‟ furthermore suggests 
that the former is what was the norm, and the latter how this norm was replaced by 
something different. Calling it „a sense‟ is decisive here as it is thus no longer a question of 
actually having a responsibility in the sense of being held responsible for a certain state of 
affairs. „A sense‟ rather suggests a feeling or emotion as awareness of being concerned with 
the impact of one‟s actions on one‟s surroundings. If it is such an emotion how can it then be 
characterised? Initially it must be a rather resident emotion, meaning that it must be part of 
one‟s character in some way and not just an emotion that comes and goes like bliss or shame. 
In order to estimate the degree or reach of one‟s responsibility in a given situation i.e. the 
lengths one will go to in meeting one‟s responsibility for sorting one‟s garbage, a rational 
estimation will be required which indicates that this „sense‟ is also a consideration or an 
awareness of how to act in certain situations. This further indicates the necessity for action 
(or inaction) of some kind since if this „sense‟ is not followed up with action of some sort it 
will not be of much use. So another characteristic of a sense of responsibility is that it must 
be motivating for action or in-action in some way. The motivation for action or in action 
must furthermore be chosen freely by being un-coerced in order to truly be „a sense‟ of 
anything. If one 'acts responsibly' only because the law says so, it cannot be considered to 
derive from one‟s sense of responsibility but instead from a sense of fear of punishment. On 
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the other hand it seems that one can have a genuine sense of responsibility if one meets one‟s 
actual responsibilities (as defined by law) such as paying one‟s taxes for instance, both 
because the law says so and because one finds it agreeable and thus acceptable
20
.  This 
brings up the question of what actually motivates this sense of responsibility? It is very 
likely that what Glendon has in mind is that this sense is caused by a general concern for 
one‟s surroundings and a respect for other people.  
 
In one chapter in Rights Talk Glendon actually discusses one such potential motivator for 
increasing one‟s sense of responsibility. The object for this discussion is the missing law to 
rescue in American legislation
21
 and the implication it has for people‟s sense of 
responsibility. Glendon believes there to be a connection between legislation of the duty to 
rescue a person in peril (given that performing the rescue would not be overly risky for the 
rescuer)
22
 and how the population in general view what is to be considered to be morally 
required in such a situation. Glendon explains her claim as follows: “law, especially 
criminal, family, and constitutional law, is aspirational and educational, expressing 
something about what kind of people we are and what kind of society we are in the process 
of creating” and later continues “…there is reason to believe that public discourse, in 
neglecting responsibility, is doing less than it might to encourage fairly widespread 
American attitudes about duty and obligation (Glendon, 104-105).  
Glendon believes that the law is or can be motivational and educational as to the degree of 
sense of responsibility we have for one another in society. This means in other words that 
Glendon claims that people derive, at least in part, their moral standing on certain issues 
from what the law has to say about it. Here the issue is 'easy rescue' and Glendon believes 
that people are more inclined to perform an easy rescue where the law says that this is 
everyone‟s duty provided the circumstances are in place. One important aspect here is that 
                                                          
20
 It is however a contentious matter how morality and legislation are connected and if obeying the law is 
actually a sign of actually acting morally or not? Law can work educationally by reinforcing your already held 
moral commitments or to convince you of the moral merit in a given action or inaction. In this particular 
context it is however implied that if law is the only reason why you do something which would be 
considered to carry moral merit, it cannot be considered to express such a sense of responsibility. The 
relation between law and morality will be discussed later in different contexts. 
21
  I am aware here that this question cannot be said to include the whole Western world since this law is 
actually present in most Western countries except for the United States. I perceive however the relevance of 
the question to go beyond this specific case on the duty to rescue as it represents the general question of 
the relation between legislation of duties and people’s view on their moral duties to other people.    
22
  I am aware that the term ’overly risky’ is a moot point that requires further qualification. I won’t elaborate 
further on this as it is without concern for the analysis. 
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such a law does not have the purpose of motivating good samaritanism by fear of 
punishment if people do not perform this duty as required. Glendon remarks that in Europe 
where these laws are being used in most countries the fines for violating the law are set very 
low “to emphasize that the purpose of the legislation is largely hortatory23” (Glendon, 84). 
To back up this claim Glendon presents some rather disturbing courtroom cases where 
people in various situations failed to perform such an easy rescue. These cases are quite 
extreme
24
 and Glendon admits that fortunately they are also rather rare. In all of the cases the 
unfortunate incident was followed by a lawsuit on the part of the person that had needed the 
rescue. In addition to this Glendon also comments on one American study on the subject that 
discovered that if people who were asked to evaluate certain scenarios in which people 
needed to be rescued, beforehand were told that there was a legal requirement of assistance, 
they tended to judge the morality of conduct in such situations much more severely than 
when not told that there was such a legal requirement (Glendon, 88). 
Glendon also quotes several scholars, lawyers and jurists who argue in favour of her 
conviction: “For good or ill, our government is the potent, the omnipresent teacher”25. A 
French scholar said in a similar vein: “...the rescue laws serve as reminders that we are 
members of society and ought to act responsibly” (Glendon, 85).  
One factor that plays a crucial role in modern times is, however, the claim discussed earlier 
regarding the disappearance of community as argued for mainly by Etzioni. Glendon who as 
earlier stated also subscribes to this notion explains how this greatly changes the situation. 
“In places and times where law is only one of many coexisting systems of social norms – 
and not the most important one among them – the silence of the law on many subjects is of 
no particular importance… In heterogeneous modern states, however, common values are 
harder to identify, while law and its official enforcement apparatus are more universal and 
highly developed than other forms of social regulation… law is now regarded by many 
Americans as the principal carrier of those few moral understandings that are widely shared 
by our diverse citizenry. In these circumstances, legal silences can acquire unintended 
meanings” (Glendon, 87). “Traditionally, it may have been a sufficient explanation of the 
                                                          
23
  ‘Of an encouraging nature’. 
24
  One such case involved a boat rental company that had rented out a canoe. At some point the canoe tipped 
over and the man cried for help to the people of the company sitting on the shore of the lake and could hear 
him clearly. They did not react but simply watched the person slowly losing his grip on the canoe and 
drowning (Glendon, 79). 
25
  Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 482 (1928) 
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no-duty-to-rescue rule that the approval or disapproval of the community could be counted 
on to see that most people did the right thing most of the time … As social norms become 
weaker, a kind of moral vacuum arises. We need therefore, to be aware, when we restate 
traditional legal norms, that law has a tendency in our society to move into this vacuum” 
(Glendon, 102).    
The claim about the disappearance of the community is of fundamental importance to 
Glendon as the factor that has caused such silences in law to actually become problematic. 
 
Glendon‟s claim here seems quite plausible. Legislation and morality are interconnected in a 
way which affects people‟s behaviour and judgement on moral issues. Some things require 
clarification though. The study that Glendon refers to is not necessarily very supportive of 
her claim. When people in a situation are being told that a duty to rescue is/is not part of 
legislation the question becomes overly suggestive. The necessity of actually having to 
inform the test subjects on the actual situation regarding legislation on the duty to rescue is 
telling of a problem with the test itself and with a presumed relation between morality and 
legislation. How many people are aware that there is or is not such a duty in the legislation? 
If such a law is meant to only have a hortatory purpose it must be crucial that people are 
aware of its existence. Glendon contends that in the United States (the country with the most 
law students in the world) the law students are taught about this rule and about the important 
differences between legality and morality in American legislation (Glendon, 80-81). 
Glendon also mentions throughout the chapter that the public is informed about this rule 
through court-room decisions not just between private individuals but also how social 
workers, police and other public officials on several accounts that Glendon mentions have 
failed to meet responsibilities. Glendon believes in general that  
“The principal changes that have produced this effect are the greatly increased 
power and pervasiveness of law and central governments … law for better or for 
worse now penetrates deeply into every aspect of life. Government whether 
pursuant or not plays an ever greater role in the lives of individuals as a source of 
support and security” (Glendon, 101-102).  
 
That government has grown in most Western countries in parallel with the development of 
the welfare state is probably quite undeniable but one can still question to what extent people 
are exposed to and informed about the presence or absence of a law about the duty to rescue. 
As already mentioned Glendon herself admits that the cases she uses in the chapter are quite 
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rare (and quite extreme) so a higher degree of law and government in the general citizen‟s 
life does not need to involve a general familiarity with this duty. One can also question that 
if this claim carries merit there might have been conducted a study that would show the 
consequences of having or omitting this duty in legislation. A comparative study between 
one nation with this law and one without would be able to demonstrate clearly the effect of 
such a law and thus to confirm or deny the claim that the law counts as a factor in shaping 
our sense of responsibility.  
 
The discussion of the reasonability of claiming that communities were something that mostly 
belonged to the past proved that the definition of what a community is, is very important to 
support such a claim. But the one element of Etzioni‟s argumentation to which I gave most 
credibility; the presence of a moral voice in this context could render support to Glendon‟s 
claim that this aspect of a community could have an insulating effect on people‟s sense and 
extension of responsibility. This is to be understood in the sense that it seems likely that in a 
society (or community) where people are generally unafraid and in fact motivated to speak 
out when a certain moral code is broken these people can be said to be more aware of what is 
considered to be moral behaviour and thus less affected by the presence or absence of this 
duty to rescue. It makes sense that the tendency to perform such an easy rescue potentially 
could be higher if one comes from a place in which there is a natural climate for being more 
morally aware and acting out one‟s sense of responsibility rather as a matter of instinct. And 
in the absence of such a climate it could be argued that people will need to look elsewhere 
i.e. to law in order to find a source for one‟s basic moral framework.  
 
Glendon's point in addition to this was that the place where these responsibilities were 
nurtured earlier has now been taken over by a certain 'rights mentality'. Although not being a 
term that Glendon neither defines in detail nor one she uses throughout I believe this term is 
fitting for what I wish to analyse in Glendon's theory of rights. I will not treat this claim as 
literally meaning that rights are now occupying a certain place where there used to be a sense 
of responsibility as I do not believe Glendon intended it to be understood literally. What is 
meant is probably just that the sense of responsibility that used to exist has been corroded 
and a different mentality more concerned with rights has in effect gained more momentum. 
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The term rights mentality suggests a certain way of thinking which is based around the 
concept of rights. Glendon argues that this is in fact the case and she explores this particular 
„rights talk‟, as she calls it, in depth in her book. As already noted Glendon takes as a given 
the breakup of communities and the increased individualization in society. Her argument is 
therefore based on viewing rights as a sociological phenomenon which has changed the way 
people think about what they are entitled to. Glendon underlines that it is fundamentally a 
change in our political discourse as to the way people argue for their beliefs that has 
undergone a change with a new rights discourse where needs and wants become expressed 
through a language of rights. This has at the same time had an influence on how people in 
society consider their position in between what they can claim and what they deserve from 
society.  
 
At the centre of this claim is the argument that rights are often perceived to be absolutes in 
the sense that rights can be used at any time and in any situation and nothing or anybody can 
get in the way of this (Glendon, p. 18-19). It is here important to note that this absoluteness 
is merely perceived and is therefore not an essential characteristic of rights. Glendon 
illustrates this with a telling example of a courtroom case where two tenants had a dispute 
over issues of noise. Since they were neighbours one was complaining over the noise that the 
other made and, in referring to the lease, stating that any disturbing sound provided grounds 
for throwing a person out of the apartment (Glendon, 19). The noisy tenant claimed on the 
other hand that since his apartment was his home, no one was to tell him what to do there 
(Glendon, 18). This shows that both positions, equally extreme, are such that they leave no 
room for further debate as it will have to be either one way or the other. Every reasonable 
urban dweller is well aware that neither can you 'do whatever you want in your own home' 
nor can you ever expect complete silence living in an apartment where the roofs, floors and 
walls are shared with other people. It is Glendon‟s conviction that rights have come to 
dominate discourses of these kinds of disagreements over the last few decades and so has the 
ability to divide disputants by creating mutually unrealistic expectations on both sides of the 
disagreement. “Absoluteness is an illusion, and hardly a harmless one. When we assert our 
rights to life, liberty, and property, we are expressing the reasonable hope that such things 
can be made more secure by law and politics. When we assert these rights in an absolute 
form, however, we are expressing infinite and impossible desires – to be completely free, to 
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possess things totally, to be captains of our fate, and masters of our souls” (Glendon, 45). 
Although the above illustration might be a bit exaggerated (it is hard to believe at least that 
anyone would believe that any disturbing sound would provide a ground to kick anyone out 
of their apartment) it seems familiar how people sometimes act in these and similar 
situations. One possible explanation could be that being in possession of rights means quite 
often that you have a capacity to order certain things around in a certain way and if this 
power is not restricted in any way it is not hard to imagine that one could come to perceive 
one's rights as means to safeguard particular interests against any outside interference. In 
other words we find out that our rights can help us to get things the way we want and we 
then come to treat these rights as absolutes, as our guarantees to securing certain interests. 
 
Another example that Glendon uses is that of abortion. This issue was much discussed at the 
end of the 1980's and throughout the 90‟s and in the United States the debate was especially 
fierce. Two camps developed to represent each side of the issue. On one side were the 'Pro 
life' supporters and on the other 'Pro choice'. What was significant, however, was how the 
debate quickly took the forms of right claims so that it became a struggle between 
'everyone's right to life' (here foetuses are perceived to have rights as well) opposed to 
'anyone's right to choose over one's own body' (disregarding that one's own body in the 
situation of pregnancy partly belongs to someone (or something) else). Again, when rights 
become the dominating discourse the positions are radicalised to a degree where compromise 
and further dialogue become seriously inhibited (Glendon, 66). Asserting your claims using 
the language of rights is perceived to be a particularly strong discourse that more effectively 
demonstrates an interest. But to Glendon this tendency has disastrous consequences for 
society: “We make it difficult for persons and groups with conflicting interests and views to 
build coalitions and achieve compromise, or even to acquire that minimal degree of mutual 
forbearance and understanding that promotes peaceful coexistence and keeps the door open 
to further communication” (Glendon, 15). Glendon believes that being possessors of rights 
has a corruptive effect on us as they are tools that give us the opportunity to do something or 
to get something merely by claiming that we have a right to it. Throughout her book 
Glendon quotes a common American attitude about what is best about living in America. 
The answer is often that, in America “one can do whatever he wants”, “that there are no 
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limits” etc. Glendon sees these expressions as examples of how people glorifying the 
concept of rights have become people who equate these nearly with absolute freedom.  
 
Glendon's notions on how rights are perceived as absolutes have, however, received some 
critique. Richard A. Epstein who has written an extensive review of Rights talk does not see 
much of a problem with this absoluteness of rights on which Glendon places much emphasis. 
Epstein believes that this absoluteness is an indispensable part of rights – to provide them 
with any force at all. “Over vast ranges of human activity, absolute rights are the 
indispensable baseline against which various kinds of market transactions are conducted. 
The greater power to exclude includes the lesser power to admit on conditions” (Epstein, 
1109). As one can see, Epstein backs this up with the situation of commerce. The thought is 
that if rights were not absolute one could not conduct any business since one did not have the 
power to claim and to hold on to an item. Epstein is correct that rights to property need to be 
absolute since they otherwise would be of very limited use as he also illustrates
26
. But 
property rights are but one kind of rights and many other rights such as social rights are not 
considered absolute as they often have to be weighed against the rights of others. But granted 
that Glendon did actually only talk about property rights she probably would not argue 
against this; that would simply not be in her interest. As Epstein notices himself: “Glendon is 
no thoughtless realist or naive utopian who thinks that the legal system can get along without 
any conception of rights and duties” (Epstein, 1107). But why think that Glendon wishes to 
change the basic conception of rights, or the contents of them? Her quarrels are rather with 
the discourse of rights and how rights have come to invade premises that to her conviction 
are ill-suited for such a discourse. It rather seems that Epstein has misread or misinterpreted 
the actual intention of Glendon‟s treatment of the absoluteness of rights and this critique falls 
outside of what Glendon wishes to bring attention to, in her book. The frequent use of the 
word „perceive‟ in discussing the supposed absoluteness of rights points to an important 
aspect of this rights mentality we try to identify. Glendon is careful to make a distinction 
between what is contained theoretically in rights and how, on the other hand, they are used 
and thereby understood by people. This gives heed to the fact that Glendon is talking about a 
certain discourse (or mentality if you will) of rights and is not trying to criticize rights as 
such.  
                                                          
26
  Not all agree however that property rights always are absolute, which means that they are not absolute. 
This lies however outside of this discussion. 
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The high esteem that Glendon ascribes to rights is convincing when rights are conceived as 
giving the power to decide on a certain order of affairs. Just as the way we have power over 
and try to control children, animals and nature does now and again get out of hand simply 
because power in itself is addictive, so can our culture of having rights make us over 
confident and create illusory hopes and demands that far supersede what was intended with 
the right in the first place. The term „rights mentality‟ seems very fitting in this context as it 
emphasises a tendency to think in rights, in concerns relating to what you can reasonably 
demand of goods and services and freedoms from society. Furthermore it does not seem 
farfetched that the dominance of rights has contributed significantly in diminishing a 
correlative sense of responsibility as rights naturally enjoy higher popular appeal as they 
provide people with advantages whereas responsibilities or duties does exactly the opposite 
and therefore does not enjoy the same esteem. 
 
Ronald Dworkin uses in this regard a useful analogy by comparing rights with trump cards 
in card games like Bridge. The idea is that just as a trump card in most card games insulates 
against any outside interference rights seem apparently to have a similar function in that “if 
anyone is made to abridge my freedom of speech I can play my 'trump card' and have the 
decision revoked in a court of law” (Hodgson, 209).  
While this might be true it does nonetheless present a problematic vision of society, as 
Hodgson and others have observed (Ibid). If everyone in society considers their rights as 
trumps that can be used against each other and against society as a whole, there will be little 
concern left over for the interests of others or for how using one‟s rights might impact 
others. This phenomenon has been captured well by Etzioni who has observed that “soon 'I 
can do what I want as long as I don't hurt others' becomes 'I can do what I want because I 
have the right to do it'” (Etzioni, 8). This last quote also captures another significant aspect 
about how Etzioni believes rights are conceived; that they stand as arguments in their own 
right. When you have a right to do a certain thing you need not justify why you wish do it. 
Etzioni claims that having a right is in itself now thought to be a sufficient reason to make 
use of it. 
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Rights and rightness 
This brings us to the normative claim about confusing „rights with rightness‟. This is 
interesting as it suggests a connection between legislation and citizens‟ conceptions of 
responsibility and of rights. How exactly this is to be understood is left open as Etzioni, who 
coined the phrase, only mentions it briefly on pg. 263. One way to understand it is that the 
various legal rights that people are granted are generally understood to carry within them a 
certain moral legitimation which means that, using one‟s rights is a right in itself 
independent of what consequences it might have for the wider society. It lies implicitly 
herein that although one „has the legal right to use one‟s rights‟, there are circumstances 
where a certain conception of morality dictates that it is not the right thing to do. Again it is 
important to underscore that this is not an intrinsic quality of rights; neither that it is right nor 
wrong to make use of them. It is rather a recognition of the fact that using one‟s rights is 
quite often an act that has consequences for society, which implies that there are instances 
where it could be considered morally wrong to make use of one‟s rights although you do 
have a legal right to use them. The tension between having a right and expressing this right is 
a tension between, on the one side possessing a legal right entitlement, and, on the other, the 
practical expression and use of this entitlement. Having a right to do something means that 
one has the power to use this right. This can mean either a power to do a certain thing 
without people interfering i.e. to use your right of free speech or to claim a certain thing 
(welfare or service) from someone or something; i.e. the right to have a job. Since rights do 
not come with instructions as to how or when it is appropriate to make use of these rights it 
is largely up to people them-selves to decide as to when and under what circumstances they 
wish to make use of them. What Etzioni believes here is that some (or many) people do not 
realize the difference in merely being allowed to do something without being punished for it, 
and then to know in what situations one is morally permitted to make use of one‟s rights and 
when one is not. What is under question here is the situation where one can use one‟s rights 
to do wrong. Understood as such, this claim is quite central to both Etzioni and Glendon. It 
is Etzioni who has coined the term and noted (as mentioned above) that “there is a gap 
between rights and rightness that cannot be closed without a richer moral vocabulary – one 
that invokes principles of decency, duty, responsibility and the common good, among 
others” (Etzioni, 263). 
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A good example of how this could happen is the now famous controversy about the 
„Mohammed Cartoons‟27. Apart from being interesting from a culturally normative 
viewpoint as to what is considered to be blasphemy and what is within the confines of irony 
and satire, this case is also interesting from a perspective of rights since the basic 
legitimation for printing the cartoons was that it was done in the name of the right to 
freedom of expression. The editor of the newspaper responsible for publishing the cartoons 
claimed that he was aware that what they were doing would be considered provocative but 
stated simply that having such an attitude “is incompatible with contemporary democracy 
and freedom of speech, where one must be ready to put up with insults, mockery and 
ridicule”28 and so there was sufficient legitimation to carry on with the project and thereby 
offending millions of Muslims all over the world. The element in rights that is responsible 
for this is then that in using certain rights you have an influence on some state of affairs in 
the world.  
It seems that to have a right to do something can have a blinding effect on the person so that 
all other concerns are suspended and set aside. Although not stating it clearly Etzioni would 
probably argue that the cause of this confusion of rights and rightness lies in how people in 
the Western world have gradually lost a sense of responsibility for their actions - qua his 
arguments about the loss of community and the moral voice. It can furthermore be said to be 
Etzioni‟s conviction that the increased desire for privacy, autonomy and personal freedom 
has caused people to confuse having the right to have rights with the rightness to use rights. 
He illustrates this through several cases but mentions specifically the ACLU (the American 
Civil Liberties Union) as an eminent example of this trend. This association is determined to 
oppose any measures taken that will decrease individual freedom and has, among other 
things, been opposing so-called sobriety checkpoints where cars, busses and motorcycles and 
                                                          
27
  Also known as ‘The Muhammed crisis’. An incidence that happened in 2005 where the Danish Newspaper 
‘Jyllands-Posten’ printed twelve caricatures of the prophet Mohammed. In addition to be condescending 
and ridiculing some of the drawings illustrated Mohammed carrying a bomb in his turban and thus explicitly 
making a reference between Islam and terrorism. The printing of the drawings were justified as being done 
according to the human right of free speech. Nonetheless the drawings where received by most Muslims 
with anger and fury as they felt insulted by seeing their prophet not only depicted (which Mohammed 
cannot be according to the Koran) but depicted in what they thought were very humiliating and 
condescending ways. This was followed by massive protests and demonstrations throughout the Middle East 
where embassies were burnt to the ground and Danish flags put on fire by angry mobs.    
28
  Jyllands-Posten Muhammad cartoons controversy. (2011, November 26). In Wikipedia, The Free 
Encyclopedia. Retrieved 14:00, November 28, 2011, from: 
 http://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Jyllands-
Posten_Muhammad_cartoons_controversy&oldid=462532811 
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other motor vehicles are forced to be checked for drunk driving. The ACLU have also held 
rallies against forcing drivers to wear seatbelts and motorcyclists to wear helmets. Despite 
very positive results that especially these checkpoints have had in lowering the rate of 
alcohol related traffic accidents
29
 the ACLU believes that it is an intrusion on personal 
liberty and should therefore be stopped. The same argument goes for the examples about 
seatbelts and helmets.  
Etzioni notices here that the popular saying of „I can do what I want as long as I do not hurt 
anyone‟ does not apply here, since the consequences of not only drunk driving are obviously 
disastrous for society. But also motorcyclists that refuse to wear helmets and drivers refusing 
to use seatbelts, also become burdensome for society since those killed potentially leave 
behind families and relatives that society will now have to take care of. To Etzioni such 
incidences are clear indicators that people tend to think that if there can be said to be a right 
to something then it is automatically also morally justified. He believes that this is a clear 
indication that the insistence on individual freedom has been over-emphasised when people 
speak out against such measures being taken (Etzioni, p. 170-172).  
Two things seem to characterize this phenomenon. Using rights in the absence of any moral 
consideration for how this will affect other people, demonstrates a significant absence of 
responsibility and a lack of concern for other people, and on the other side, a highly self-
centred and egotistical individual. When no responsibility is attached to making use of one‟s 
rights one can easily get accustomed to thinking that using rights are for free; that they are 
the trumps that we hold against the rest of society and other people that guarantees that we 
will receive our fair share and that we will not be trampled over by rules and decisions made 
over our heads and without our consent. That rights have come to take a place like this in the 
minds of people is not hard to imagine when considering the changes the world has 
undergone in the last 60 years with big cities that are more like little countries with extreme 
diversity. How the market as the primary factor has increasingly individualised us to the 
extent that, what we have left to count on – is our rights. Without rights one can easily get 
the feeling that they are left up to the mercy of forces far beyond their control but where 
rights on the other hand not only have the effect to provide as effective blockers against 
these forces abusing individuals. Rights have now additionally attained the role of tools that 
                                                          
29
 In the 1980'ies 250.000 people got killed and 500.000 injured each year in The United States alone (Etzioni, 
170). 
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help individuals or groups to push their interests through without having to care about the 
costs this has for the greater society. 
Etzioni has additionally noticed that the high esteem that rights enjoy from both sides of the 
political scale seems to give the impression that any limitation or decrease in the number or 
the reach of rights is ruled out even before it is discussed: “we are willing to fight and die for 
your freedom to be irresponsible and even socially harmful because the alternative would 
sweep away so much good speech along with the bad” (Etzioni, 201). 
Having said this it can naturally quickly be inquired as to how or with what measure one 
should decide the circumstances to which it would be morally permissible or not to make use 
of a certain right. How important should one‟s interest be before it is permissible to use a 
right and how much harm can one permissibly impose on society in using a right? These are 
naturally important questions and one could easily discuss at length whether a principle 
involving a certain threshold until which one can harm society would offer guidance; or if a 
balancing of harms and benefits would be better or fairer; or if one would always consider 
that one cannot use a right if it involves any harm for society. 
I believe, however, that such abstract calculation would not be what Etzioni (or Glendon) 
would believe to be the solution. The recurring term of „a sense of responsibility‟ understood 
as „an awareness and concern for the impact and the consequences of one‟s own actions and 
in-actions, for the general well-being of the wider society‟ as defined above, is most likely 
what they both believe is missing in today‟s society and what at the same time embodies the 
solution to the moral vacuum that they believe for a large part is the reality today.  
 
So far we have gone through various sociological consequences that have led to the present 
situation we are in now which is characterised by a thinking in rights which I have argued 
have had certain negative consequences on how people consider what is to be expected from 
them in terms of contributing where possible to upholding and sustaining civil society.  
Etzioni‟s insistence on communities as where the answer lies to the declining morality of 
today has to be withheld. Etzioni is right when he claims that the community as a societal 
institution has the capacity to generate and sustain a moral climate that can affect the moral 
disposition of the community-members positively. On the other side Etzioni pays little 
attention to the less positive features such as illiberalism, inequality and intolerance that 
Brint pointed out also are defining features of especially traditional communities. The 
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community as a way to generate citizens with a higher sense of responsibility is not without 
problems and Etzioni‟s argument cannot be accepted unconditionally. 
Conclusion 
Rights, as a means for keeping order and social control, are effective at doing just that, as 
they provide a good basic safety net for people to hold up against oppression, racism, assault, 
illegal prosecution and other evils that should be held at bay at all times. This immediate 
effectiveness of rights for social control is at the same time how rights have achieved their 
strong appeal both legally in the minds of jurists, legislators but also popularly in the minds 
of politicians, NGO‟s, HR activists and with ordinary people of any political orientation.  
The deep belief in rights in the Western world as what could safeguard the basic interests 
and needs of all (to be free from coercion, liberty of thought, freedom of movement etc.) and 
as an effective to claim certain goods and services, seem however to have come with a price. 
Handing out free privileges without asking anything back in return is not only unsustainable 
from a logical perspective
30
. There is a lack of willingness to realize that rights, as has been 
shown, can have potentially harmful consequences in the all too easily corruptible mind of 
man. In a critique of human rights Onora O‟Neill described quite well the problems 
concerning the high esteem that rights enjoy:  
“We find it unsurprising that the ruling ideas of past eras have been superseded 
and modified, and we can hardly doubt that human rights are a central ruling 
idea of our age. Yet we do not find much current discussion of the likelihood that 
the idea of human rights may suffer the same fate. Public discourse is for the 
most part admiring, and often represents human rights as unquestionable truth 
and progress: we may question anything - except human rights” (O’Neill 2005, 
439).  
 
Although this is not entirely true as scholars have been critical towards the human rights 
since they were adopted in 1948, O‟Neill‟s comment serves as a reminder of the difficulty of 
criticizing elements that are constituted as a basic frame of reference which is part of one‟s 
understanding of the world – which currently constitutes a paradigm in our time. 
 
                                                          
30
  It could here be interfered that one of the basic thoughts behind the welfare state is that one’s duties to 
society are largely made up of the high percentage of taxes people usually have to pay in exchange for 
enjoying the privileges of rights without having to do much or anything in return. I merely speak of a purely 
logical connection between rights and duties as being dependent each on one another. 
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Realizing that society indeed works as a moral educator it is necessary to look at rights, as 
one jurist once said that any lawyer had to look at the law: Through the eyes of an evil man. 
Just as effective they are for social control and for protecting the weak against the powerful 
equally effective are they as tools, for furthering particular interests over the wider interests 
of others, for stubborn insistence on certain interests that virtually rule out the possibility of 
compromise and agreement. There is strong reason to believe that rights may have changed 
our ways of considering what our moral commitments to other people are. If our moral 
commitments to other people stop at the extent to which their rights reach into our sphere of 
bound obligations then it seems that we can go through our lives without caring much about 
the well-being of people around us. Rights do not (and were probably never intended to) tell 
us anything about why (or even if) we should be helpful to one another, if we should be 
concerned for the welfare of other people with whom we live together. Essentially they do 
not guide us as to what is right and what is wrong behaviour in various situations.  
 
We will now shift the focus of attention away from Western society and look instead to 
Confucianism which offer a very contrasting view for how to organize and govern a society. 
Whereas the Western society is ordered around the liberal notions of freedom for each to do 
as (s)he wants as long as no one are harmed, Confucianism considers the value of freedom 
much less significant but emphasize instead the importance of directing that freedom 
towards the aspiration of learning how to be a benevolent human being.  
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CONFUCIANISM 
What is Confucianism? 
Grasping the full extent of what Confucianism is can be a challenge, especially for a 
Westerner. Not only does Confucianism transcend Western categories and disciplines such 
as philosophy, religion, psychology and politics but it has been especially troublesome to 
make sense of the integration of the secular and religious realms as these have been 
separated in the West ever since Plato (Yao). Confucianism covers almost all areas of life 
including personal ethics, societal norms and values, teaching, learning and personal 
aspirations. Most importantly though, Confucianism penetrates the personal, the public and 
political spheres as “Confucianism in the past provided the basic framework for society and 
especially the relations between its subjects” (Yao, 31, 32). 
 
Religion, philosophy or politics? 
By transcending traditional barriers that are taken for granted in the West such as 
private/public secular/religious, Confucianism provides both a full-blown political 
programme, an ethical system and a religious practise and worked as “a guiding principle 
permeating the way of life in China” (Yao, p. 31). It was not just a Chinese phenomenon but 
had a firm grip in most of the East Asian region. Korea and Japan also developed their own 
specialised versions of Confucianism over the years (Yao). 
The many dimensions of Confucianism mean that scholars have given very different 
accounts of what it is, and as a consequence, the subject has generated fierce debate among 
scholars (Yao, 34). Philosophy has mainly identified Confucianism as an ethical system 
wherein the moral dimension was seen as the most important. Other scholars have looked at 
Confucianism from its political perspective, how it penetrated entirely the institutional 
structure of society and was thus described as a sort of state orthodoxy. Others again have 
focused on elements of mysticism, sacrifice and worship by regarding Confucianism mainly 
as a religious practise (Yao). Another consequence of Confucianism's pervasive character 
has resulted in the question of whether in its time it was seen as 'one of the major 
achievements of the human mind' or as 'an obstacle for forward progress' and 'the cause of 
the backwardness of China' (Yao, 38). 
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It is not easy to determine how far Confucianism dates back in history, is mainly due to a 
misunderstanding of the word 'Confucianism'. What we in the West call 'Confucianism' is 
according to Yao largely a misnomer
31
 of the tradition since this label gives the idea that it is 
based around the teachings of Confucius. This is only true to some extent. Confucius worked 
as a transmitter and a sort of re-initiator of the tradition known as Ru which, directly 
translated, means 'the doctrine'. Ru was a collection of classical texts on which Confucianism 
became based. Confucius helped also to further elaborate on these texts and developed the 
tradition by giving it structure and he is generally recognised as the person who turned Ru 
into Confucianism. But it is not to be equated with what Confucianism is and Confucius is 
neither regarded as its saviour nor as its lord (Yao, 17). 
 
That Confucianism actually managed to be the major point of reference for a very large 
region in the world for more than 2000 years is in itself an impressive fact. The secret to its 
longevity despite all the changes societies undergo during such a long time, is to be found in 
another of Confucianism's key features - that of being a tradition based on continuous 
learning and study (Yao). It is inherent to Confucianism that anyone can learn to be a good 
(virtuous) human being by indulging in studies and following the examples of the sages. In 
this sense Confucianism was able to incorporate changes in society, since learning was 
always „learning in context of the surroundings‟. “Confucian temples may be demolished, 
devotion to its sages abolished and Confucian followers may be stripped of their social 
privileges, but Confucianism can still survive and thrive as long as learning is permitted, and 
the classic texts are available” (Yao, 29-30). 
In basic terms Confucianism can be described as an action-based ethical system that seeks to 
create and sustain a harmonious society by focusing mainly on the moral development of 
individuals through self-cultivation. Of fundamental importance here is that Confucianism 
has a total-view of moral behaviour by encompassing both the action and the intention of the 
action, and would thus be termed as being both consequential and de-ontological according 
to Western ethics (Yao, 32). 
 
 
 
                                                          
31
 ”An incorrect or unsuitable name or term for a person or a thing” - www.dictionary.com 
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A bit of history 
In order to give a brief historical overview of Confucianism in its different stages and forms 
I will use 'the three stages theory' developed by Tu Wei-ming who is a very influential 
contemporary Confucian scholar. I am fully aware that this is by no means exhaustive and 
that many particularities are hereby lost. This approach will be combined with another more 
elaborate five-step approach cut out by Yao. It seems to me that a satisfactorily historical 
account lies somewhere in between these two methods. I wish merely to place Confucianism 
in a rough historical frame; it will not be of any analytical relevance whatsoever.  
 
The first period (aforementioned and wherein the tradition attained its basic form and 
became known as Confucianism) is where we find the three great Confucian teachers: 
Confucius (551-479 BCE), Mengzi (371-289 BCE) and Xunzi (310-211 BCE). Confucius 
grew up at a time of political turmoil, which was what inspired him to think about how to 
better establish a peaceful and harmonious society. Subsequently he developed his theses 
around two basic notions: “That goodness can be taught and learned, and that society can 
only be in harmony and at peace under the guidance of wisdom” (Yao, 26). Without luck in 
his work as a public servant he eventually decided to spend his life teaching. He is 
considered responsible for the restoration of Confucianism especially because of his 
promotion of the junzi
32
 as an ideal attainable for everybody and his emphasis on secular 
rather than religious matters. 
In many ways Mengzi followed in the footsteps of Confucius. He saw Confucius as his great 
ideal and he also attempted to forge a career working for the state. His main thesis was that 
the state should not be ruled by laws and punishments but humanely by letting the people 
follow the good example of the ruler (Yao). His teachings went along the same lines as those 
of Confucius but he became known as being very humane. He was considered Confucian 
due to his views that human beings were essentially good and his optimistic views of human 
destiny in general in a time of much uncertainty (Yao). 
 
Xunzi, the last of 'the three great ones', was, however, markedly different. He was critical of 
many of the Confucian doctrines which he did not believe to be true to the actual thoughts of 
Confucius. Xunzi imported various elements from other traditions such as Daoism. He 
                                                          
32
 Read more on page 52-53 
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identified Heaven with nature and he was more concerned with human affairs than with 
metaphysical ones. In opposition to Mengzi's view, Xunzi believed that human nature was 
essentially evil as it was driven by desires. This could however be transformed into ren 
(humaneness) by proper education (ibid). Xunzi was a realist in many regards and Yao 
characterizes him as 'unmatchable both in Chinese intellectual history and in the Confucian 
tradition' (Yao, 78).  
 
The second period was Confucianism's renaissance period
33
 from approximately 960 to the 
beginning of the twentieth century, according to Yao. In this period Confucianism met 
challenges from both Daoism and Buddhism. Confucian scholars were able to integrate 
elements from both traditions and results in what is called a new Confucian Learning Dao 
Xue or as it became known in the West as Neo-Confucianism. The success of the endeavour 
is proven by how Confucianism spread beyond China to, in particular, Vietnam, Korea and 
Japan, where the tradition became partly re-formulated so as to be incorporated into the 
different social and political structures of these countries (Yao).  
 
The third epoch of Confucianism started in the twentieth century, where one has to presume 
that Confucianism had been in decline since the previous period, since Yao (9) again states 
that 'prominent scholars devoted their lives to the revival of Confucianism'. What is 
significant, however, is that Confucian scholars re-interpreted Confucianism in the light of 
Western traditions. In the 19
th
 and 20
th
 centuries Confucianism was blamed for being the 
reason for Chinas slow development in comparison with, for example, Japan's much earlier 
modernization. Recently, as earlier noted, Confucianism has once again become a centre of 
attention and now enjoys considerable public esteem within China and is becoming a much 
debated topic within academia
34
.  
 
Confucianism, perceived as a political/ethical tradition, offers a very elaborate programme of 
how to organize a society. As will be illustrated, the Confucian vision of a good society rests 
on very different conceptions of the human being, on the relations between them, and 
                                                          
33
 The renaissance indicates (obviously) that Confucianism was severely devalued as a tradition in the end of 
the former period due to what Yao calls 'extensive exegesis' that drained the Confucian scholars form energy 
and Confucianism was thus left largely unattended for some time. 
34
 Especially Daniel A. Bell has noticed this recent surge and is treating this as a phenomenon in a recent book 
called China's new Confucianism. 
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especially on how to regulate society in the most comprehensive way to achieve the ultimate 
goal of Confucianism, harmony. 
  
I will mainly focus on political and moral aspects of Confucianism that can help to give an 
insight into how civic society was organised and the mechanisms that were thought up to 
guide, restrict and manage human social behaviour. Whilst being an enormously social and 
community-oriented philosophy that does not recognize concepts such as „private‟ and 
„public‟ it follows that to understand the basic thought of Confucian morality one needs to 
understand how the human person is essentially characterized and how concepts such as the 
individual, family, morality, learning, society and the state are related. The various concepts 
that are treated in this account are selected on a basis of providing a broad and 
comprehensive vision of Confucian ethics. The focus of the section rests on identifying and 
understanding the various mechanisms that make up the politicization of Confucian morality.  
 
The overall question that will lead this section is, once again:  
How would Confucianism respond to the purported problems endemic to 
governing society and social behaviour primarily with rights? 
 
The different perceptions of morality in Confucianism and in the West are largely based on 
diverging views on certain values. In the West morality is based around liberal values such 
as the freedom and autonomy of the individual. In Confucianism these are based on the 
individual as relational and the emphasis is thus on behaving according to certain pre-
conceived ideals. These two views will be discussed in relation to the good of society and 
the good of the individual.  
 
The structure of the section on Confucian politics and ethics is rather based on a Confucian 
taxonomy than a Western one, which has the consequence that the reader will not find such 
labels as: individualism, morality, politics or society. The labels used are based on Confucian 
intelligibility and so staying as close as possible to the intended idea and vision of 
Confucianism. 
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Confucian ethics and politics 
“For Confucius, unless there are two 
human beings, there are no human 
beings” 
 
The importance of family and relationships 
The elemental structure of society was based on the idea of how an elementary nuclear 
family is constituted. The family was a model for Confucian society in two different ways. 
Metaphorically, in the sense that the relation between the citizens and the ruler was 
considered to be parallel to that of children and parent (or the padre); politically, the family 
was considered to be the basic unit of society (Nosco, p. 25). The rationale behind this was 
that if independent families each and by them-selves were doing fine then so would society 
as a whole (Ibid).  
The concept of „family‟ was, furthermore, central as it contained the basic relationships one 
has in life, which serve to teach the double role of both receiving and giving when being in a 
relationship. The relationships in a family are obvious to anyone as one is always a son, a 
wife, a father and so on and the different moral requirements according to the specific role is 
naturally learned. The family sets the premises for the first lessons of Confucian morality in 
learning how to behave in different roles according to the requirements of the relation. The 
deep integration of individual, family and the wider society in Confucianism is tied together 
by five different relationships. These relationships were, as here stated by Mencius: 
  
Between parent and child there is to be affection 
 Between ruler and minister, rightness 
 Between husband and wife, [gender] distinctions 
 Between older and younger [siblings] an order of precedence 
 Between friends, trustworthiness 
     (de Bary, 1998, p. 17)
35
 
                                                          
35
  It should be noted here that this is but one version (an early one) of what defines the relationships. 
Confucius defined the contents of the relations somewhat differently as did Xunzi by for instance stressing 
the importance of filial piety from children towards the parents and also emphasizing loyalty as the most 
important duty from a minister to his ruler (de Bary, 1991, 119-120). Confucianism has undergone many 
changes and many important aspects have been reinterpreted and changed according to the requirements 
of society at any given time. 
  
49 
 
 
The persistent focus on family is made quite clear by three of the relations being familiar. 
Since everyone would be familiar with having parents and siblings Confucius stated that the 
virtue of filial piety one feels towards one‟s parents and the brotherly love one feels towards 
one‟s brothers and sisters were the most elemental and most important virtues to learn for the 
further development of other virtues.  
 
As already mentioned, Confucianism was a highly hierarchical tradition causing most of 
these relationships to be unequal in nature. The nature of the inequality in Confucianism was 
the insistence that all human meetings essentially are unequal. Only the friend/friend relation 
can be considered equal although with time one will usually come to occupy an either 
dominant or subordinate position in this relation. 
A key value and a further basic lesson was that inherent in these relationships was a 
fundamental notion of reciprocity. Each part in the relation has certain duties towards the 
other and each part can therefore also expect certain duties to be carried out in the other‟s 
favour. This is best exemplified in the relation of the ruler and the people i.e. the parent/child 
relation as noted above. The ruler cannot expect the people to follow him if he is not just and 
does not treat the people well. If the ruler imagines how his decisions affect the people, 
ruling just and well should not be very hard (Chang, 122-125). The foundation of the 
Confucian relationships is therefore that one should fulfil the role and the responsibilities 
that define the particular relationship. In the case of the father/son relationship the 
importance of filial piety towards the parent is usually what defines the son‟s role towards 
the parents. It was generally considered that children owed their parents their life since child-
birth was considered 'an extreme sacrifice' (Chang, 122) and are therefore under the 
obligation to 'return the favour' when the parents grow old and are gradually become 
incapable of taking care of themselves.
36
 This is also proof of the inherent reciprocity present 
in all relations that children are to respect their parents and do as they say out of gratitude for 
the life they have been given and also for learning this core virtue in the ideal setting (de 
Bary, 1991).  
                                                          
 
36
 Filial piety is a duty so deeply embedded in Chinese culture that it is now implemented in the law that 'one 
is under a duty to care for one's parents, once they no longer themselves are capable hereof ‘ (Wikipedia 
contributors. "Confucianism." Wikipedia, The Free Encyclopedia. Wikipedia, The Free Encyclopedia, 4 Nov. 
2011. Web. 12 Nov. 2011.) 
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Chang also considered the inherent inequalities in these relationships a lot less strict than 
what they seem at first glance as he notices that emphasis on filial piety does not mean that 
the parents do not have any obligations towards the children. “A father should behave as a 
father and a son should behave as a son” (Chang, 120), said Confucius, which, according to 
Chang, meant that the father can only expect his son to treat him with respect and honour 
him if he treats the son as he ought to (ibid). However, this did not imply that the son had to 
blindly obey his father, since “if one's parent is about to commit a wrong one should gently 
advise against it; if the advice is not accepted, one should be respectful and not defiant, 
fearful of the consequences but never resentful” (Chang, 120). In general it was taken as 
natural that one's parents care about the children through love and affection and it was 
considered more important to guide the child since it was clearly the child being 'the student' 
i.e. the inferior in this relation. Confucius stressed this in the following notion of the true 
meaning of filial piety:  
“Only the person who carefully scrutinizes what is to be obeyed can be 
considered truly filial” (Chang, 121). According to Chang, Confucius was careful 
to point out that obedience did not imply ‘blind obedience’. Chang further points 
out that Xunzi agreed on this and remarked that “one should obey what is right 
but not *necessarily+ one’s father” (Chang, 121- (brackets Chang’s)).  
 
You were to follow orders as a rule of thumb but at the same time it was important to remain 
critical to the content of these orders to not let a wrong be committed. This shows also that 
there was respect for some autonomy and individuality in these relationships which, 
although unequal, are not rigidly unequal but allow for the father to learn from his son in 
cases where he has lost his Way dao. The importance of everyone fulfilling their various 
roles was crucial for preserving a well-ordered harmonic society, as stated in the following 
often quoted paragraph: “If names are not rectified then language will not be in accord with 
truth. If language is not in accord with truth, then things cannot be accomplished” (Nosco, 
30). What is meant here is that one must act according to one's designated role (name) in 
order to keep society harmonious (Ibid, 30).  
 
When the authoritarianism inherent in Confucianism is perceived in this context of 
relationships this inequality is given a much more humane feel as it is obvious to most that 
the relation between a son and his father is in nature unequal and that this is quite naturally 
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so. Henry Rosemont also suggests that one should perceive these relationships in a more 
positive sense by not focusing on their hierarchical nature. Rosemont suggests instead that 
one could perceive the relationships dynamically as a duality of benefactor and beneficiary. 
Such a view would imply that in every relation there are both certain privileges and certain 
obligations and one enjoys the former by performing the latter. And this relationship can 
change on a day to day basis such as,  if one does a friend a favour one day and the next day 
the favour is reversed, or as when a student benefits from one's teacher one repays that debt 
when (perhaps) one day one becomes a teacher oneself (Rosemont Jr., 52). Rosemont 
emphasises here the reciprocal element of the relationships and argues that if both parts 
would benefit from the relationship the inequality would be of lesser importance. The last 
example is interesting by being asymmetric in virtue that „the favour‟ here is not returned to 
the benefactor but continuously given on to new generations. This asymmetry is interesting 
as it redefines the relationship of benefactor and beneficiary by the idea that „favours‟ can 
rather be considered as contributions for the common good.    
 
These remarks aside, inequality is nonetheless a fundamental aspect and so an inherent 
problem of Confucianism seen in relation to contemporary standards. In cases where the idea 
of reciprocity would fail the inferior part would be left to the mercy of the superior.  It is 
especially problematic to use similar arguments of benefactor/beneficiary as above regarding 
the status of women as being irreducibly subordinated to men.  
 
As demonstrated previously, the non-coercive approach to ensuring a peaceful civic society 
was of key importance in Confucianism. Rosemont has also noted another important aspect 
of Confucianism, namely that it is an action-based morality: you are not a friend, a parent or 
a ruler before you actually perform according to that description. Although it is often heard 
that in Confucianism there are no individuals, one could here infer that you are no one 
without being in relation to someone else. Stated differently, you can only perform as a 
friend, once you actually have a friend and perform as a father only when you have children, 
to which Rosemont has emphatically captured that, “if I am the sum of the roles I live, then I 
am not truly living except when I am in the company of others” (Rosemont Jr., 51). 
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This can easily (and often does) give the idea that terms such as privacy and individuality do 
not resonate much within Confucianism. Since Confucianism is an extra-ordinarily social 
tradition, according to Rosemont 'the most social of all traditions' (Rosemont Jr. 46) this is 
true to some extent – especially if the comparison is with the extreme importance these 
concepts are given in the West. For Confucius fulfilling all of one's five relationships was a 
way of shaping one's personality.   
 
Virtue, ritual and self-cultivation 
The fundamental idea of Confucian ethics was that of guiding people morally by developing 
each person as a well-functioning moral agent. Self-cultivation is in this sense the most 
important mechanism in Confucianism and can be seen as being the source and drive 
towards the common goal of both inner and outer harmony in Confucianism. Self-cultivation 
consists of the two components of virtue and ritual, each of which have the role of guiding 
and disciplining people towards The Way
37
. In Confucianism there are the Five Regulations, 
humaneness (ren/jen)
38
, righteousness (yi), rite/ritual/propriety (li), wisdom (zhi) and 
faithfulness (xin) and these are actually all Confucian virtues at the same time (Yao).  
 
Self-cultivation 
Confucius made ren the centre of his teachings and he saw the achievement of ren as the 
most important thing in the world. What this humaneness consists of is nowhere defined in 
Confucian texts, which is a consequence of the term itself being 'open-ended and 
indefinable'.  According to de Bary (de Bary, 1991, 32) it is described rather as „a doing‟ 
than as something that 'is', something that arises out of people when entering into relations 
with others (de Bary, 1991). Self-cultivation in Confucianism was not just a matter of 
studying the ancient (or less ancient) texts diligently. Confucianism is a tradition based on 
                                                          
37
  See appendix 1.2 for an explanation of  ’The Three Ultimates’: the Way dao, Heaven tian and Harmony he. 
38
  Homer D. Dubs has noticed that the concept of ren originally meant 'benevolent love' but due to a 
misunderstanding that arised because of a pun Confucius made that involved the word ‘human’ which is 
pronounced similarly as ren but written differently. Mencius however picked up on the pun but merely 
repeated it which has caused many translators to ascripe the meaning ‘humaneness’ to the word ren (Dubs, 
48). I will however repeat the misunderstanding to avoid any confusion later since ‘humaneness’ is the 
commonly used translation of ren.  
 On a different note ren and jen are used interchangeably by different authors and they all give the same 
meaning of 'humaneness' – except naturally for the above-mentioned author. 
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action and on actively taking part in the relevant matters of society. „Confucian‟ is rather 
something you do than something you are. Accordingly, Madsen notes that the term „self-
cultivation‟ in Confucianism has both a purely literary and an introspective side to it as well 
as a practical side of participating in both family and societal matters by fulfilling the various 
roles one partakes in every day (Madsen, 14-15). By emphasizing this very performance-
based aspect into self-cultivation and emphasising how Confucian learning is dependent on 
the wider society, it is once again underlined how the Confucian individual irreducibly is 
embedded into social relations since being a part of and taking part in society is how one 
learns, performs and sustains Confucianism (Ibid). In this rather long quotation from the 
Great Learning
39
 it is shown, almost with poetical elegance, how self-cultivation and 
learning is the essence of fostering a harmonious society, it is carefully underlined how the 
wellbeing of self, family and society are all interconnected and interdependent: 
 
“The ancients who wished to manifest their clear character to the world would 
first bring order to their states. Those who wished to bring order to their states 
would first regulate their families. Those who wished to regulate their families 
would first cultivate their personal lives. Those who wished to cultivate their 
personal lives would first rectify their minds. Those who wished to rectify their 
minds would first make their wills sincere. Those who wished to make their wills 
sincere would first extend their knowledge. The extension of knowledge consists 
in the investigation of things. When things are investigated, knowledge is 
extended; when knowledge is extended, the will becomes sincere; when the will 
is sincere, the mind is rectified; when the mind is rectified, the personal life is 
cultivated; when the personal life is cultivated, the family will be regulated; 
when the family is regulated, the state will be in order; and when the state is in 
order, there will be peace throughout the world (Nosco, 24). 
   
From this one can also deduce that a good ruler will see to it that the surroundings of 
individuals stimulate individual growth in order to create a society ruled by order (Madsen, 
16). The ideal of a harmonious Confucian society thus depended on every member indulging 
in learning and practising the virtues of certain prescribed rituals so as to develop a 
sufficiently moral character that would make „his will sincere‟.  
                                                          
39
  One of the important classics from the Confucian canon. 
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The Confucian 'gentleman'  
The importance of learning to be human in Confucianism, basically the learning of ren, is 
linked to another important concept that takes up much space in the Analects; that is the 
chün-tzu or junzi - which de Bary translates as 'gentleman' (de Bary, 1991, 28). The junzi is 
described as: “a class of well-bred persons with gentle ways, impeccable manners, and a 
developed moral sense. The junzi is furthermore a man who has learned all five of the above-
mentioned virtues and masters these in such a way that they 'generate the appropriate 
response and corresponding virtue in others'” (Ibid, 29). The innate reciprocal element that is 
a fundamental part of being human in Confucian thought is here considered to be an 
important element of the junzis. According to de Bary, Confucius did not expect everybody 
to restrain and perfect them-selves to the same level as the junzis. Instead, their importance 
was that of reciprocating similar feelings in others so as to influence others to improve 
themselves (Ibid, 29). Especially, Confucius was aware that since the people tended to „ape 
the leader‟ what was important was that these junzis were not just „high-profile Confucians 
on a throne‟ but were out amongst the people to spread their wisdom, teach and inspire them. 
Becoming a junzi was possible for any Confucian only through continuous study and 
practice of the five virtues. This was furthermore an important aspect of Confucius‟ 
teachings; that everybody had the chance to excel since everything that was needed was 
already part of every human being. 
 
The ideal of the junzi existed before Confucianism existed as a tradition but Confucius 
expanded the term significantly so that it signified 'the totality of superior human qualities 
and the embodiment of humaneness' (Yao, 214). It is easy to imagine that Confucius was 
well aware of the positive consequences of promoting 'the Confucian ideal' as obtainable by 
everybody and as someone enjoying great admiration and what could facilitate upward 
mobility in society. “The aspirations to become a junzi provide the power and the motive for 
Confucians to engage in learning and to put that learning into practice. Thus the scholars 
learn how to cultivate and control their disposition and to harmonise their emotions, which 
are then manifested in their actions with regard to all worldly affairs” (Yao, 215). 
In the religious/mystical realm of Confucianism existed an even higher ideal than that of the 
junzi. The few worthy junzis had the possibility of becoming sages. The description of 
sagehood takes on almost mystical proportions as it is described as becoming 'one with 
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Heaven and Earth' by experiencing enlightenment where one realizes the true nature of 
oneself (Yao, 216).  
 
Learning serves as a fundamental driving force in Confucianism, both as developing and 
keeping the tradition alive but also as to what Confucianism actually is as to what it means 
both to be and to become a Confucian (Confucians would probably infer that one never 
„finishes‟ in becoming Confucian.). “All the programmes in Confucian learning and practice 
are designed to help the learner to attain sagehood, a goal which is believed to be attainable 
through spiritual cultivation in one's secular life” (Yao, 216). Sagehood in this sense is more 
linked to Neo-Confucianism and its mystical character is, according to Yao, a consequence 
of how Buddhism came to have an influence on Confucian thought in this period. 
The rites 
Another very important concept in Confucianism for moral guidance was 'the rites' li. And 
„guidance‟ here is to be strongly differentiated from learning since the function of the rites 
were rather to sustain and maintain what had already been learned. As with many others of 
the central terms the precise meaning of rites escapes Western epistemology, which has had 
the consequence that various scholars have attached different terms to it. The term itself is, 
however, of great importance for our present concern, so looking into some of the meanings 
and descriptions that have been attached to the term would seem worthwhile.  
Primarily the term has both a religious and a secular meaning. Yao speaks of rites rather as 
rituals and treats them in a religious context as connected with various forms of sacrifice and 
rituals in the sense of ceremonies and certain rituals performed at weddings, funerals and 
such (Yao). Other authors (Wm. Theodore de Bary, Tu Weiming, Daniel A. Bell, Joseph 
Chan and Wejen Chang) speak of rites rather as a set of principles, norms or regulations or 
as the 'rules of propriety'. As a standard, most authors refer however to li as 'rites'. 
 
Rites pre-dates Confucius' time and so is not as such a purely Confucian concept. In this 
period the rites worked more or less as an equivalent to laws in society, but rather in the 
sense of being an integration of both norms and laws. With time the rites lost their hold on 
society as people thought they were too rigid and were considered old-fashioned. This led 
Confucius to re-interpret the meaning and the purpose of the rites and so connected them 
specifically with the concept of ren. He proclaimed that the performance of rites was to be 
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both an inner and an outer affair and was crucial for self-cultivation. Additionally, it was 
emphasized that the rites were absolutely crucial for anyone aspiring to become a junzi. 
(Chan, 114-116). Engaging in rites was a matter of following a set of norms that governed 
certain aspects of social behaviour including what was expected from people in the five 
relationships. Chan describes that performing the rites was equal to an expression of ren – of 
humaneness and through dealing with others it was the expression shu the art of expressing 
sympathy and reciprocity (Chan, 117). This presence of ren as the implicit goal and reason 
for performing rites is crucial since  
“without the spirit of ren, these aspects [fulfilling your role in the relationships] 
may lead to, at best, mechanical observance of rules without a humanistic 
concern for others or, at worst, selfish domination of the stronger party over the 
weaker one. Ren serves to instil a strong humanistic spirit into rites, providing an 
ethics of sympathy, reciprocity, and care into an otherwise essentially 
hierarchical system of social relationships” (Chan, 117).  
 
Chan states additionally that the rites were what provided order in the hierarchic order in the 
Confucian relationships by effectively impeding the superiors in exploiting their position by 
prevailing on them to always show concern to -and respect for the inferior (Ibid). 
 
In performing the rites it was important to do this with a 'sincere heart'. The thought was that 
learning virtues alone was not enough as one had to learn them in „the right way‟ or for the 
right reasons. Confucius had recognised that striving towards doing the right thing, to being 
a man of virtue, could easily become corrupted by inner desires and other distractions and 
rites were the reference that could guide one's development of the virtues. In the same vein 
Confucius also spoke of the rites as 'the essential correlate of virtue' (de Bary, 1998, 32) and 
saw the three concepts of humaneness, riteness and learning as a unified single ethos (de 
Bary, 1991, 40). The essential purpose of the rites is best expressed in the following quote:  
“Courtesy not in keeping with what is rite becomes laborious bustle; caution not 
in keeping with what is rite becomes brashness; forthrightness not in keeping 
with what is rite becomes rudeness” (de Bary, 1991, 40).  
 
Rites are thus closely linked with learning and self-cultivation and can be characterized as 
being a mechanism of sorts that guides a person between one's desires and what is right in a 
given situation. Rites can therefore be said to be one part of a duality by coordinating the 
will and the behaviour of people in a given situation in life. As such, there was a certain 
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dynamism present in the concept which henceforth gave rise to the expression of doing what 
is rite, which means not only that one should weigh each situation according to certain 
principles but also according to what is right meaning that certain situations can appeal to 
several principles (or several virtues) but some might be considered more correct under the 
given circumstances than others, which is how the rites can help give guidance. 
 
This normative ascription to the rites was implemented later by a neo-Confucian, “Lü”.  
According to de Bary, Lü defined rite as “a formulation of principle directly in relation to 
facts and circumstances. It combines the constancy and universality of principle with its 
differentiated application to all human affairs, while 'right' or 'rightness' pertains particularly 
to the appropriateness of an action in time. Both are indispensable to the employment and 
fulfilment of principle in the mind” (de Bary, 1991, 67). Especially interesting is the 
description of rites as consisting both of constant universal principles that coordinate 
behaviour accordingly but also as (once again) being a very dynamic concept that manifests 
itself in various situations and circumstances and additionally points to what is right as a 
normative concept. For Lü, rites are not just a moral reference for inter-personal relations but 
a cosmic principle that incorporates the whole world and the 'entire natural order'. This 
elevation of rites from an anthropomorphic (focused on human beings) to a cosmic principle 
(focused on the whole planet) is explained by Lü, conceiving rites as being directly derived 
from Heaven (de Bary, 1991, 67-69).  
 
This transition ranging from steadfast principle to dependency of context is an important 
aspect of the rites since, as Chan notes, rites at times may conflict and since two situations 
are never alike it may be necessary to make use of different rites in some otherwise identical 
situations. To Confucius, any blind indoctrination of ethical principles was just as bad as not 
following any principles. Being flexible and considerate in judgement was key, which was 
also why the actual content of the rites also changed with the change of times and of social 
circumstances (Chan, 117-118).  
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Despite the rich description of especially the purpose and function of rites not much has been 
written about what kind of acts, actions or advice rites actually were. Examples are rarely 
given of what the practise of a certain rite potentially would demand
40
.   
 
Laws and rites 
A curious dialectic can be identified here between the words 'rite' and 'right' especially since 
their pronunciation in English is identical. Although a coincidence, many authors have 
picked up on how rites in some sense bear similarity to the Western conception of rights and 
show a fundamental difference in how to govern and rule a society. According to de Bary, 
Confucius‟ strong belief in the rites was partly to be explained by the political circumstances 
of his time where the rites were primarily clan -and family centred, meaning that the basic 
idea behind governing society was to perceive society as one big quasi-family that would be 
in order as long as the independent families themselves were stable. 
Confucius himself was very aware of the differences between rites and rights as captured in 
the following oft-quoted paragraph: 
“If you try and lead the people by regulations and order them by punishments, 
the people will evade these and have no sense of shame [in doing so]. If you lead 
them by virtue and order them through the rites, they will have a sense of 
shame and correct themselves” (de Bary, 1998, 30).  
 
The significance of this insight is deep and profound in the sense of its intuitive appeal and it 
is naturally of great interest to our objective here. The immediate appeal lies in the 
educational difference in telling right from wrong by either, external prohibitions and 
permissions which is how laws (and rights for that sake) work, or by teaching people morals 
by engaging them in practices that illustrate good character and so internally build a moral 
conscience that teaches right from wrong. Neither approach is without its problems, 
however, which will be taken up again later.  
 
As can be seen here it can be hard to separate the various terms from each other, mainly 
because Confucianism, as already stated, consisted of a very different epistemology and a 
very different way of expressing thoughts and ideas - considered from a Western context. 
The Confucian model of building and sustaining a harmonious society was aimed at creating 
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good citizens by sustaining a strong moral ethos that reached into the daily practices people 
underwent and so could be applied directly to the day-to-day situations human beings 
experience in life.  
 
In my own conceptualization of Confucian ethics it seems that the description of the rites 
somehow manages to encompass all of the major Confucian ethical principles. The rites are 
usually mentioned together with the virtues, and the relation between these two concepts is 
always described as being close and mutually supportive. The rites refined the virtues and 
kept them in check while the virtues were conceived as the main indicator for initiating 
action. Additionally the rites were considered an important object of learning and self-
cultivation in the sense of what would keep one steady on a moral path The Way. Finally the 
rites were also what defined the duties and proper conduct in the various relationships 
everyone was immersed in. Essentially the rites appear to have been what carried the moral 
foundation of Confucian society as a constant reference that helped to sustain moral 
relationships and to keep people virtuously intact.  
The practice of Confucianism 
Surprisingly, the effectiveness of Confucianism when applied in practise is not an issue that 
is much discussed. This can be considered quite problematic since one cannot thereby know 
how much of Confucian theory remained to be only theory and how much was actually being 
practised during the long periods of Confucianism.  
One author, de Bary, speaks of certain community schools and of so-called‟ community 
compacts‟ which according to him were “authentically Confucian, genuine expressions of a 
tradition that assigned a prime value to education and ritual – a value that endured well into 
the twentieth century” (de Bary, 1998, p. 13). Both the schools and these compacts worked 
as locally self-governed civilising instruments. They worked independently of the state and 
on a voluntary basis. De Bary remarks subsequently that these initiatives of true 
Confucianism did not survive the dynastic rulers of later centuries. But when he later states, 
“together these two earlier communitarian efforts, had they been successful, might have 
contributed to a Confucian version of a civil society” (Ibid, 14), it can be seriously 
questioned to what extent the Confucian practices as explained in theory were actually being 
implemented in society and so constituting the practical expression of Confucianism.  
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Perhaps the often heard assertion that Confucianism predominantly was a literary tradition 
means not only that part of being Confucian meant to indulge in study but that Confucianism 
simply was rather a theory of the good society than a practise of it. It has also been pointed 
out that Confucius at his time never succeeded in convincing any ruler or public official to 
implement his politics into actual practice. Mencius however had some luck in doing so for a 
shorter period of time (Cheng, 143). This uncertainty has led to many different 
interpretations since one can just as easily seriously question the causes of this uncertainty 
regarding Confucianism‟s practical implementation in society, as one can ignore it. Randall 
Peerenboom has delivered a forceful critique that will be taken up later in discussing what, if 
any, relevance Confucianism could have for the West. On the other hand since Confucianism 
in some form worked as an all-encompassing ethos in South-East Asia in long periods for 
more than 2000 years, one cannot deny that it must have had a strong cultural influence on 
people and in how they developed their thinking and in structuring their mind-sets. 
 
Daniel A. Bell seems to embrace this viewpoint in a more recent book „China‟s new 
Confucianism‟ where he argues that Confucianism has indeed made an impact on Chinese 
way of life. Bell emphasises especially the strong heritage that rites have left on various 
forms of social interaction in contemporary China. In the relations between boss/worker, 
teacher/student and rich/poor there are clear moral codices to be followed and clear 
hierarchical distinctions between the two parts. Bell seems, however, to believe that this is 
not necessarily a bad thing. On a side-note he notes that despite the clear inequality in status 
there is more often than not a mutual respectfulness present in these relations, where, for 
instance, a teacher is expected to care more emotionally for the well-being of the students 
and the boss also takes care of his workers more emphatically than a typical Western 
counterpart would (Bell 2008, pg. 45-50). Bell generally believes that the concept of ritual 
could be applied outside of China and outside of Asia as a way of controlling some parts of 
behaviour without the use of laws and sanctions (Ibid, 51-55). This proposal will be 
discussed in the subsequent section. 
 
It should be clear at this point that Confucianism taken as a whole appears in some regard to 
point in the direction we are looking to follow. By emphasizing the importance of moral 
acting by developing and sustaining a well-coordinated moral character and making these 
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elements central to all its teachings on what it means to be human Confucianism stands as an 
attractive possibility on how to create a good society and how to keep it good. On the other 
hand, one can as just as easily perceive Confucianism as a highly conservative political 
system aimed at social normalization by conforming behaviour. The emphasis placed on 
roles and relationships constitutes at the same time hard restrictions on individuals on how to 
act and behave by ascribing very definite patterns of behaviour that for the idea of 
Confucianism to work it is necessary that everyone would follow. The rites can equally be 
seen as semi-coerced social practices that present severe limitations on personal freedom 
which, together with the hierarchical nature of Confucianism, serve as a very effective 
mechanism in inhibiting social mobility.  
 
Judith A. Berling has observed that there appears to be these two differing interpretations of 
Confucianism (Berling, 5-7) – one is conservative and convinced that Confucianism has long 
ago outplayed its role as a social and political template and one is more reformist or idealist 
in expression convinced that the Confucian aspirations towards benevolence and 
endeavouring to become a person of virtue could potentially help re-balance the West‟s tilt 
towards excessive individualism and self-centeredness (Lee, 1996). Berling notes, 
additionally, that the reformist side is more concerned with ren being the centre of all 
Confucian teachings and is similarly what creates the necessary mutuality of love, respect 
and consideration for the needs of all (Berling, 5-7). These opposing interpretations of 
Confucian thought show that Confucianism is far from uncontroversial regarding its possible 
relevance today. Laying out both points of views is therefore necessary in order to say 
anything coherent on the possibility of drawing inspiration from Confucianism as a possible 
source of inspiration to the moral problems of the West.  
Rites in the West? 
Continuing from where we left off – with the treatment of rites. There are certain qualities of 
rites that are particularly appealing in relation to some of the problems that were identified in 
the West in the foregoing chapter. One such quality is that rites have the ability to keep 
certain forms of conduct tied to particular pre-scribed ways of acting which, in effect, can 
reduce conflict by exempting human emotions and particular interests from dominating. 
When the ways in which we can perform a given social or cultural praxis are already given, 
including various roles and its purpose it leaves less room for particular interests or emotions 
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from playing a dominating role. Set in relation to a Western context changing some social 
practices into rites practice could be a way to eliminate the tendency of the conflictive 
„rights-mentality‟ from dominating.  
 
When the „rules‟ are already established there is less risk of particular individuals only 
catering to their own interests or re-configuring the inherent purpose or structure of a given 
practise. We surround ourselves with so many ritualized practices every day that we are 
hardly conscious about anymore. From singing the national anthem before big sports events, 
to all the rituals involved in the ways we celebrate new year‟s eve, to how it is customary 
that a traditional Danish lunch of „smørrebrød‟ is initiated with eating „the fish‟ (which again 
goes together with drinking a shot of „snaps‟) and finishes with eating „the cheese‟. Many of 
these customs have no apparent purpose whatsoever but are merely practises that have 
become ritualized and so are beyond questioning. Developing new such rituals or rites could 
have a potentially reinforcing effect on feelings of fellowship and camaraderie. This requires 
illustration.  
 
To stay within the genre of „burials and death‟ which Bell used above one could imagine that 
the event that usually succeeds a burial ceremony - that of distributing objects of inheritance 
between the heirs - could provide an illuminating example of a practise that is infamous for 
bringing out the worst in people. The conflict that is commonly associated with this ordeal 
arises because the feelings of sorrow and mourning are temporarily replaced with egotistical 
feelings of greed, possessiveness and egoism when everyone try to secure for themselves 
what they believe themselves to be entitled to. One could imagine that such a practise could 
be ritualized in the same way as the burial ceremony is itself by stating some clear principles 
that everyone would respect as a matter of common courtesy and as a matter of tradition. 
The idea and function of the rites was exactly to have a constant normative reference to 
inhibit the tendency of egotistical emotions from becoming dominant. That way rites could 
affirm that the emotional focus would remain on what was significant.  
 
If there existed a formal practice of how to solve such issues i.e. that each heir will get to 
choose an item once a month and that it would in turns go between the heirs or some similar 
distribution scheme. This is merely a thought example of an instance where some explicit 
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rules and custom could be effective to avoid the ego-centric (and given the circumstances 
highly inappropriate) behaviour that often arises in such instances. 
Another possible area where rites could have a positive impact would be in relation to 
processes of integrating immigrants that have just arrived in a new country.  Similar to Bell‟s 
observation about how Chinese guest-workers were exposed to various routines within the 
company, developing certain rituals could make newcomers feel accepted, included and with 
the feeling of actually being „part of something‟. Bell, living and working in Beijing, has 
observed how firms and companies are practising such „company rituals‟ which he affirms 
has helped strengthen bonds between both the boss and migrant workers and the worker and 
the company. Bell argues that in this sense everybody benefits as the worker feels more 
accepted and taken care of and the boss will in effect have more loyal employees (Bell, 
2008, 55-56)  
 
Daniel W. Y. Kwok, a professor of history at the University of Hawaii does not consider 
these features of the rites in a very positive manner. Kwok believes fundamentally that 
academics that tend to place the practise of rites on moral pedestals perceive them rather 
uncritically as what could be a remedy to the moral chaos of the West (Kwok, 84). Kwok 
interprets the rites rather as a form of imprisonment for the individual by having large parts 
of one‟s life pre-given by having to „behave as a human being‟ according to what the rites 
prescribed. Kwok does not consider such rites as being particularly fulfilling because of the 
way they restricted people severely and because of the inherent inequality of these 
relationships. This left no room for the individual to actually 'be individual' in any way as her 
life was basically comprised of this network of rites (Kwok, 85).The lack of rights was 
furthermore a consequence of the inherent inequality in the practise of rites and according to 
Kwok the only talk of rights were rights for the superiors in these relationships such as the 
rights of the prince, of the patriarch, and of the ruler (Kwok, 90). In general Kwok believes 
that the spokesmen who tend to praise the rites are severely disregarding some historical 
facts about the actual exercise of rites that deliver a much less attractive illustration of how 
these actually worked (Kwok, 90-91).  
 
Randall Peerenboom has an even gloomier view of what Confucianism actually was. In his 
view such concepts as „The Way‟ and the ultimate goal of achieving harmony merely 
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worked as tools of persuasion that the ruler could use to achieve „unity in diversity‟. This 
would enable the ruler to have a fully committed people that would follow him regardless 
(Peerenboom, 240).For Peerenboom, harmony was a concept of manipulation that served to 
convince people to let go of their narrow self-interests in the name of the common good. 
Rulers claimed „The Mandate for Heaven‟ by asserting that they knew „The Way‟ and were 
therefore able to lead the people safe and well towards harmony (Ibid, 241). The necessity 
for creating such a unity of thought was crucial for Confucianism to work as a political 
doctrine and the price for this was to let go of one‟s personhood, uniqueness and the ability 
to make individual choices, according to Peerenboom (Ibid, 243). Peerenboom also criticises 
the rites for being inegalitarian and for essentially creating patterns of behaviour thought out 
by and serving the elite by conforming behaviour and thus rendering society easier to govern 
(Ibid, 250-251). Peerenboom‟s pessimistic views invite us to reconsider how the thoughts of 
Confucius and Mencius can easily turn out to provide effective means for despotic rule. The 
long periods of Confucianism no doubt gave occasion both to societies ruled in aspiration of 
the intended ideals, as well as to societies no better than any other tyranny
41
. The general 
lack of precise historical data in Peerenboom's account makes it appear rather as a warning 
of how such a system in the hands of „the less worthy‟ might turn out. The editors of the 
book wherein Peerenboom‟s paper is published are also hesitant to accept his views by 
noting that there are many examples of certain officials having authority to react and dispose 
of a ruler if they could see that his ruling was not in accordance with the wishes of his people 
(de Bary & Weiming, 21-22). 
 
Peerenboom has, despite his very critical view of the value of Confucianism in general, 
argued that the rites could actually be the one thing that might have a value for especially 
restoring a sense of community in Western societies today. “The rites have also been central 
to dispute resolution in a variety of extra-judicial forums, from the informal settings of 
family and neighbourhoods to the somewhat more formal setting of guild associations. 
Nevertheless, the rites themselves were not legally enforceable rights, claims or 
entitlements” (Peerenboom, 249). 
Participating in practices based on rites can help reinforce social and moral bonds to others. 
“In most instances, rites can complement rights, providing a moral dimension to 
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 As earlier noted it is quite unclear the extent to which Confucianism actually was implemented in society. 
One can as easily imagine a Confucian society aspiring to Confucius’ ideas as to Peerenboom’s dystopia. 
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interpersonal actions, suggesting additional possibilities above and beyond the legal relations 
defined by rights.” and may even be useful as a way to “temper the harshness of rights by 
encouraging individuals to be judicious in their claims and to be considerate to others” (Ibid, 
251). Peerenboom furthermore acknowledges that rites can have a positive impact in 
bringing people together and creating a sense of togetherness and can be helpful in resolving 
conflicts. He strongly rejects, however, arguments involving the idea that rites can take over 
the use of rights. Peerenboom stresses the importance of rights being legally enforceable and 
that they exist independently of customs, traditions and similar arbitrary arrangements (Ibid, 
249-151). Peerenboom believes however that rites and rights can effectively complement 
each other. 
Peerenboom‟s views on Confucianism are quite remarkable by initially being extremely 
sceptical to the whole enterprise of Confucianism which he considers more or less as an 
effective tool for despots to claim power over -and to control the masses. His critical view 
has not blinded him from realizing the possible potential for how the concept of rites might 
be usefully applied in the West.  
Autonomy 
Another commentator and „pro-Confucianism‟ spokesman Henry Rosemont Jr. has noticed 
how one of the liberal core values is problematic even within its own moral paradigm of 
Human Rights. Rosemont criticises the values of individualism and autonomy as essentially 
being inconsistent with some of the demands that can be asserted through Human Rights: “If 
I am essentially a freely choosing autonomous individual, it is easy to understand my 
demands that, ceteris paribus, neither the state nor anyone else abridge my freedom to 
choose. But how do such essential individuals demand a job or health care or an education? 
There is a logical gap here, which no one has successfully bridged yet: from the mere 
premise of being an autonomous individual, no conclusion can follow that I have a right to 
employment [...] jobs, adequate housing, health care, and so on, do not fall from the sky. 
They are human creations, and no one has been able to show how I can demand that other 
human beings create these goods for me without them surrendering the “first generation” or 
civil and political rights which accrue to them by virtue of their being free, autonomous 
individuals” (Rosemont, 1998, 57).  
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Rosemont's point has merit as it seems that there is a fundamental problem with the kinds of 
rights that demand positive action by others. It is simply not possible to claim these things 
without someone having to place burdens on someone else. Such rights, commonly known 
as welfare rights, require that there are other people present and furthermore someone of 
certain capabilities in order to accommodate these rights. If we accept that welfare rights are 
universal human rights we have at the same time to accept that we cannot at the same time 
be freely choosing and autonomous human beings since every demand for health care 
requires significant action on the other end of the obligation bearer to accommodate that 
claim.  
The obvious objection to Rosemont‟s point would be that the demands of such welfare rights 
do not fall on singular human beings but have been institutionalized exactly because of them 
being extremely demanding to fulfil. Having welfare rights implies equally the existence of a 
welfare society. But Rosemont‟s point is more of a cultural or idealistic nature; that it simply 
is illogical to perceive people as autonomous beings when we so obviously are extremely 
dependent of each other. 
 
The problem of rights is turned around and put into perspective when Rosemont wittingly 
asserts: “99 per cent of the time I can fully respect your civil and political rights merely by 
ignoring you. (You certainly have the right to speak, but no right to make me listen.)” 
(Rosemont, 2004 p. 59).  
These two quotes show rather boldly how there is an inconsistency in insisting that we are 
all autonomous beings and we, our-selves, are the only ones that are to decide what we 
individually are to do. Behind this thought is the idea that libertarians only have to avoid 
being physically „in the way‟ of others so that they similarly can do as they wish, hence the 
quote above. This supports an idea that you basically only have to care about yourself. This 
contrasts however with other kinds of rights that demand more than people ignoring each 
other and which embodies the realization that we are very much dependent on each other and 
therefore we also have certain responsibilities to take care of each other. Rosemont‟s point is 
that it is fundamentally a mistaken view that individuals can exist autonomously in any sense 
of the term. Against this background the view of the individual in Confucianism is much 
more attractive since the individual is not really „individual‟ in any sense but rather a 
relational being. Rosemont points out that any talk of „individuality‟ would persist in how 
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one chooses to carry out the responsibilities inherent in the relationships that make up 
Confucian personhood and sociality (Rosemont, 2004, 63) since after all “there are many 
ways of being a teacher, spouse, sibling, friend and so on” (Ibid, 64). These reciprocal duties 
constitute the daily interaction that one has with other people and how lives are connected.  
 
The strong emphasis on relationships constituting interaction with other people in 
Confucianism and how at the same the family was considered their central frame of 
reference had an unfortunate side-effect. One of the most often mentioned problems of 
Confucius‟ thought was how the centrality of the family gave rise to nepotism and 
parochialism (Wong, 37). Confucius also taught a doctrine of „graduated love‟ which 
implied that it was natural to love and care for one‟s family more and caring than for people 
further away. Confucius believed that a people‟s concern for other people was naturally to be 
strongest at home (hence the centrality of filial piety) and should gradually fade with 
distance. One should be benevolent to everyone but the persistent focus on family meant in 
reality that often governance was built upon blood relations and often the ruling class 
consisted within the same extended family (Ho, 290-291).  
A question of values 
The very different conceptions of Confucian society and Western society can be said to be 
grounded in different priorities of values. The West is drawn towards typical liberal values 
which are based in viewing the human being as an autonomous individual who at the same 
time is a private person with a „right to privacy‟ but also considered a social being and part 
of a society. What is given priority is however that the human being is a unique and 
autonomous individual whose individual freedom should be maximized in order to enhance 
individual choice and opportunities for each and every one. 
In Confucianism these priorities are radically different. The individual is not really 
„individual‟ in any sense. The Confucian human being is rather relational and gains its 
identity through the way it relates to other people in the various relationships that are part of 
any human being's existence. But seeing the human being in isolation from other people does 
not really make sense to Confucians since socialisation is not just a feature of human 
existence but its very foundation. Being autonomous or being free as such are therefore not 
values that are high in esteem either.    
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Confucius believed that certain standards of behaviour could be universalized due to „the 
similar nature of human beings‟ (Chang, 123). One can assume that this has been the 
underlying thought that carried the moral foundation of Confucianism since if certain forms 
of behaviour are to be promoted on behalf of others this must rest on the belief that some 
ways of acting are better than others. The promotion of certain ways of acting, of relating to 
others and following certain customs and routines meticulously is very much at odds with 
the basic principles of liberal thought which is rather based on the premise that „you can do 
as you please as long as you do not hurt others‟42. This basic premise is naturally based 
around ideas of freedom, individuality and autonomy for human beings; that people are their 
own masters and free to choose their own fate and way of life (again underlying the principle 
of not causing any harm to others).  
 
One thing that is central to any political doctrine is the realization that people are capable 
both of doing good and bad. Whether or not people from birth are either good or bad is here 
beside the point. This realization has led to the development of laws and rights in the West 
that work as a deterrent to harming others. In Confucianism, on the other hand, this 
realization led to the development of certain practices that were aimed at creating an ethos of 
virtue and self-cultivation in society with the purpose of providing both an incentive and 
guidance for people to develop their characters according to what was considered to be good 
and right. These two moralities can be perceived as two different approaches to solving a 
problem. The „problem‟ here would be: How to prevent people from doing wrong?  
 
Seung-hwan Lee, a professor in philosophy at Korea University, has made an analysis
43
 
where he contrasts these two approaches and argues for the advantages and limitations of 
each approach. Basically Lee agrees with the basic importance and necessity of rights and 
believes that rights are fundamental for protecting the inherent dignity of the human being. 
On the other hand he argues that a morality based on rights is insufficient as it merely points 
out what is obligatory or required, what is permissible and what is forbidden: “The moral 
dimension of the language of rights… is minimalist because it cannot take into account other 
normative categories that are also significant parts of human experience, such as 
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  Usually referred to as ‘the harm principle’. 
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  Lee, Seung-hwan:  Liberal Rights or/and Confucian Virtues? Philosophy East and West, Vol. 46, No. 3, 
Seventh East-West Philosophers' Conference. 
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supererogatory and meritorious acts. For example, rights cannot require benevolence (jen); 
they do not provide a moral reason to act benevolently in the way that they can compel one 
to perform those duties specified by corresponding rights.” Lee further illustrates his point 
quoting Roger T. Ames: “To use Human Rights as a measure for the quality of life possible 
within the community is like using minimum health standards as a universal index on the 
quality of restaurants” (Ames, 13).  
Freedom 
Lee‟s concern is with the inability of liberalism to make sense of the action that lies outside 
of the area of being either required, permissible or forbidden action. He believes that such a 
morality is unable to distinguish between acts that are purely selfish and indifferent to the 
interests of other people (and perhaps also against the interest of the community) but 
nonetheless permissible and other acts that are directed at helping the needy or at expressing 
benevolence, which similarly are merely permissible to perform (Lee, 374-375). The 
libertarians have lost sight of which actions actually carry moral merit and which actions do 
not and have therefore created a morality that does not inspire to do good but merely 
punishes if you do bad. 
 
Confucian morality looks instead at the full spectre of possible action instead of merely 
teaching what you should do to act morally in various situations and not just under what 
circumstances one should refrain from acting in certain ways. In Confucianism one has to 
learn to act in ways that would seem exemplary to other people by not being controlled by 
one‟s desires. It is by cultivating one‟s character that one achieves the insight and the 
capacity to overcome the tendency to act out only according to irrational impulses (Lee, 
372).  
Lee is aware that towards this, libertarians will concede that the importance of cultivating a 
good character is a basic good for society but when this is forced upon people, leaving them 
no choice for deciding themselves, such self-cultivation becomes rather totalitarian 
indoctrination in some sense (Lee, 370). The libertarians naturally dislike the thought of 
anyone deciding what „the good life‟ might consist of as it goes against the central liberal 
values of freely choosing individuals that are entitled to choose their own fate – whether 
good or bad in the eyes of others. But when is someone really choosing freely it might be 
implied? It could easily be intervened that it requires a certain insight and consideration to 
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reach any vision or conclusion of what the good life might be. It requires some experience 
and some insight, in other words, to have a balanced view on what one would take to be 
„good‟ in any sense of the term. The libertarians‟ conception of freedom is based on the 
absence of any physical constraints in order to be able to choose freely among a number of 
options. Lee believes that such an understanding of freedom does not inspire any vision of 
the good life and further points out that “a chronic alcoholic and a drug addict might be said 
to be free as long as nobody interferes with their interests and rights” (Lee, 371). To Lee, 
both kinds of freedom are of importance and he acknowledges that Confucianism might not 
consider the negative freedom of opportunities strongly enough. This leads to the conclusion 
that “a total freedom includes both maximization of options and self-realization. “A liberal 
person needs self-overcoming and the cultivation of his character, and a Confucian person 
needs the availability and protection of options in choice and action” (Lee, 373).  
Lee believes that having rights actually requires that one has a sufficiently developed moral 
character that is capable of hierarchically ordering certain actions, as of higher or lower 
moral significance in the moral sphere of merely permitted action. Similarly Lee has also 
noticed that claiming rights on some occasions does not lead to the claimers dignity but can 
be used as a weapon of vengeance and even to make others suffer in certain, circumstances 
(Ibid, 367-375).  
 
Lee believes furthermore that the libertarians‟ conception of freedom is inadequate since it 
revolves around the idea of negative freedom i.e. a freedom concerned with being free from 
physical constraints. By showing that freedom is not merely a freedom of options but equally 
a mental capacity to distinguish between conflicting desires of instant gratification and the 
deeper thoroughly rationalized capacities of a self-aware agent provides a compelling 
contrast to the largely taken-for-granted value of freedom in the West. There might be a gain 
of a different kind of freedom by promoting an ethics of self-cultivation and building of 
character in contrast to „letting people loose‟ morally without any ethical guidance or 
calculus for telling right from wrong whatsoever. If some parts of people‟s freedom have to 
be restricted to teach people virtues of respect, reciprocity and benevolence this may not 
only be a gain for society but also for people them-selves by learning the skills of how to 
distinguish the moral significance of various actions and of distinguishing desires from real 
needs and from interests.  
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At this point one of Confucius‟ most insightful sayings could bare repetition:  
“If you try and lead the people by regulations and order them by punishments, 
the people will evade these and have no sense of shame [in doing so]. If you lead 
them by virtue and order them through the rites, they will have a sense of 
shame and correct themselves” (de Bary, 1998, 30). 
Conclusion 
We can conclude so far that there is a certain hollowness in Western society regarding what 
so far has been termed „a sense of responsibility‟. Rights, as has been sufficiently argued, 
play a significant role in this development in the sense that rights (or laws for that sake) by 
themselves do not inspire you to do good. They rather induce a mentality more concerned 
with what you are entitled to. The impact of the gradual disappearance of communities is 
also a factor here but the actual value of communities is less clear and more controversial.  
Rights are, however, a rather tricky concept as they seem to play a double-role by, at one and 
the same time being an irrefutable humanitarian accomplishment of our time as a means for 
granting human beings the recognition of that minimal amount of dignity. To be able to hold 
a check against oppression and other forms of undignified and demeaning treatment and so 
making rights an entirely indispensable value. The backside to this glorification of rights has 
been that morality in the West has become one based purely on right claims and prohibitions 
which leaves a moral gap where other forms of action such as benevolence or helpfulness are 
entirely unrecognized. Both kinds of action are merely considered permissible; just as 
permissible as being unfriendly and ignorant.  
 
Confucian morality on the other hand excels exactly in being a morality that points out „what 
you should do be [a good] human being‟. To accommodate this ideal certain concepts and 
practices have been developed so as to guide people into what is considered to be good 
human conduct. This approach is also flawed for several reasons. Without any rights people 
do not really have a way of securing themselves against oppression, exploitation and 
degradation. If not everyone in society „acts as human beings‟ everyone else is potentially at 
risk of these kinds of mistreatments. Furthermore, there might be some people that do not 
agree with what has been decided it is to „behave as a human being‟ and will resist being 
pushed towards this ideal. In the next chapter I will examine if it would be possible to reach 
a solution between these different perspectives and challenges. 
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Rights and duties 
 
The objective of this chapter is to look further into the relations between rights and duties. 
Referring to „relation‟ in plural is important since the concepts of right and duty are complex 
when spelled out in detail as are their various connections. Far from being a unitary concept, 
rights come in different shapes depending on context and their use. Equally changeable is the 
extent to which they place burdens on other people and society. This depends in particular on 
what the content of the right is, to whom they are addressed and what obligations are implied 
in the right claims and whom these obligations affect. Furthermore, as will be shown, duties 
are not always in direct correspondence with any rights. The possibility of duties that are not 
owed to anyone will be a central part of the analysis as they appear to point to the direction 
of our central concept of „a sense of responsibility‟.  
Because of this complexity a systematic analysis will be necessary in order to clarify the 
various meanings of „right‟ and how they relate to the various meanings of „duty‟ and so 
hopefully will enable a clearer understanding of the underlying structure of rights and duties. 
The point of doing this is (1) to pinpoint scope of rights and duties as well as their 
interconnections in relation to context and to use; (2) by relating the concepts of rights and 
duties to an account of ethical consideration it will be examined what the significance is of 
starting from the perspective of either recipiency (rights) or of agency (obligations).  
The working question for this section was, once again: 
What are according Onora O‟Neill the bounds of required ethical consideration 
that goes beyond the bounds of justice in her integrated account of justice and 
virtue? 
 
I will follow Onora O‟Neill‟s approach based on integrating accounts of virtue and justice. 
This approach is ideal for two reasons. First, it presents two perspectives on ethics and 
emphasizes the strengths and weaknesses in both and how each perspective dramatically 
changes the scope of ethical consideration. Secondly the two perspectives justice and virtue 
can arguably be seen as representations for Western society on the one side (justice) and 
Confucianism on the other (virtue). The value of O‟Neill‟s approach lies in how it is possible 
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to identity certain inconsistencies and shortcomings in an ethical perspective based on justice 
by conducting a purely conceptual analysis. Likewise she demonstrates that an ethical 
perspective based on virtue is equally fallible in other areas and she argues therefore that 
none of the perspectives are sufficient on their own.  
The Hohfeldian system 
This distinction between different types of rights was discovered by the American legal 
theorist Wesley Hohfeld. Hohfeld found out that a right is not just a singular term with a 
singular meaning but actually a rather complex concept that can mean different things in 
different circumstances and so also have very different implications for those at the other end 
of the rights; those that are to respect the rights. In order to understand better the concept of 
rights Hohfeld created a system to identify the different types of rights and the resulting 
different types of obligations that the rights in effect create. This has since then become 
known as „The Hohfeldian system‟
44
. 
 
It is necessary to distinguish between at least two different kinds of rights here: Liberty 
rights which entail rights that give the agent freedom to be, to do and to act in certain ways. 
Hohfeldian liberties are however rather restricted as to what would normally be applied to 
this term. Having a liberty to do something merely means that you are free to do a certain 
thing if you have no duty to do it
45
. Furthermore, no one else has any duties not to interfere in 
your doing so. For the same reason authors often use the term privilege instead of liberty to 
signify this narrow meaning.  
A different type of rights is claim rights. Contrary to liberty rights, these rights imply 
corresponding obligations on the part of signified others – the so-called obligation bearers. 
These obligations can be of both a positive and a negative nature. Claim rights that involve 
positive action require the obligations bearer to actively accommodate the claim, i.e. if A has 
a claim against B that he owes him 5$ then B is obliged to pay A the 5$ which involves 
positive action. If on the other hand A has a claim against B (and possibly also against C and 
D…) to let him move around freely then B has an obligation to refrain from interrupting A in 
moving around freely. Such an obligation is thus one that requires negative action. As a 
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consequence claim rights are much more demanding than liberty rights precisely because 
they demand positive action. 
Hohfeld identified four different types of rights by referring to what these have respectively 
as opposites and as correlatives: 
 
Primary rights: 
 Liberty rights (or privileges): you have the right to do X, if and only if, you do not 
have a duty to do X i.e. you have the right to speak freely but are under no duty to do 
so. 
 Claim rights: what you have the right to claim, if and only if, someone else has a 
duty to satisfy that claim, i.e. you can claim the money that someone owe you but 
only if they actually owe you that money. 
Secondary rights: 
 Powers: when someone has the power that enables him to alter primary rights, i.e. a 
policeman has the power to annul a person‟s right to freedom of movement. 
 Immunities: you have an immunity, if and only if, no one have an ability (power) 
within a set of rules to alter this incidence, i.e. in (certain countries at least) you have 
an immunity against the government enrolling you in the army. 
 
The categories „primary rights‟ and „secondary rights‟ indicate two different levels on which 
the rights can manifest themselves. The former refers to rights over property and rights over 
one‟s own person and the latter to the rights that you have over your primary rights i.e. the 
right to waive one of your primary rights. Also, secondary rights can change the situation 
over someone else‟s normative situation by temporarily annulling his primary rights i.e. if 
one holds sensible information crucial to the security of the country one‟s liberty-right of 
free speech can be temporarily annulled by the government
46
. 
In order to specify the other end of rights Hohfeld made a system of correlativity where he 
identified how each kind of right corresponds to a specific duty. Correlativity means that one 
necessarily implies the other such that if you have a right then someone else must 
necessarily have a duty. Claim-rights are thus dependent on the existence of other people or 
certain institutions in order to make any sense since you cannot have any rights to anything if 
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there is no one to give heed to those rights. Liberty rights, on the other hand do not imply the 
existence of others in Hohfeldian terms.  
 
Correlations: 
If A has a Claim, then some person B has a Duty. 
… Liberty, … No-claim. 
… Power, … Liability. 
… Immunity, … Disability. 
 
According to Hohfeld “one relation is correlative to another if and only if it is true that (1) 
both relations have the same content, (2) the object of the first relation is the subject of the 
second relation and (3) the object of the second relation is the subject of the first relation
47
.   
 
The pattern of these relations is asymmetric as it can be seen that if one were to identify the 
opposites instead of the correlatives the scheme would look similar but with the „no-claim‟ 
and „duty‟ reversed and equally the „disability‟ and „liability‟ reversed and thus symmetric. 
 
Opposites: 
If A has a Claim, then A lacks a No-claim. 
… Privilege, … Duty. 
… Power, … Disability. 
… Immunity, … Liability. 
 
What is central to these relations is that they all have three parts: there is a subject of the 
claim, an object of the claim and a content. If Stan owes Nick 5$ then Stan is the object of 
the claim, Nick is the subject of the claim and the 5$ is the content of the claim. Although 
the object and the content of Hohfeldian relations often coincide it is not always so, i.e. if A 
has a claim to B that he does X. A duty is thus always connected to a specific object i.e. the 
content of the claim. One cannot, according to this scheme, be under a duty to give charity to 
the homeless for instance, since it is undefined who exactly should receive that charity („the 
homeless‟ is not one specific person).   
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The way these relations of correspondence work can be illustrated with the example of a car. 
If you own a car then you have primary rights to the car which involve a liberty to use your 
car and you have a claim towards other people not to use your car. Your secondary rights 
involve certain possibilities you have for changing this situation. You have a power to 
change the Hohfeldian relations of others and thus placing others under a liability
48
 to use 
the car if you like or you can withdraw your own rights to the car if you wish to give the car 
away and so also the rights to the car to someone else. You also have an immunity that others 
interfere in changing these relations and can create a disability for others to do so. Since you 
are the owner of the car you are the one who decides who has what rights vis-à-vis your car. 
The Hohfeldian scheme of correspondence illustrated above does not mean however that 
rights and duties always correspond in this way. With very few exceptions on how there can 
be rights with no correlative duties most theorists agree that there is a category of duties with 
no correlative rights.  
 
In order to analyse how there can be duties with no correlative rights it is necessary to look 
further into the concept of „duty‟. Duties (or obligations)49 are usually divided into two 
overall kinds: perfect obligations and imperfect obligations. These distinctions come from 
Kant‟s deontic ethics where he distinguished between the necessities of performing certain 
acts. Kant believed that perfect duties were to be performed by everyone all the time and 
were absolutely necessary duties. On the other hand, imperfect duties were not required in 
the same sense since no one possesses the rights necessary to demand their performance. 
According to Kant it is only necessary to perform imperfect duties sometimes. They were, 
however, still considered important to some extent
50
.  
In later times this distinction has been further elaborated on but still carries a similar 
meaning. The necessity of performing perfect duties is a consequence of these duties being 
correlative to rights. This means that the duties that Hohfeld works with are in effect all 
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perfect duties as they are part of the right-duty relation just discussed. As it was, everyone is 
required to perform these duties since others possess a rightful claim that the duty-holder is 
obliged to respect.  
 
Imperfect duties do not have any corresponding rights and are therefore considered un-
claimable duties. This, in consequence, makes these duties appear as freestanding acts or 
duties which are merely permissible to perform. An example of such an imperfect duty is the 
earlier discussed absence in American legislation of a duty to rescue. No one in peril can be 
said to hold any rights against someone to come to their rescue (unless someone else can be 
considered responsible for causing the unfortunate situation) and since no one has any right, 
any duty to rescue in this case would be an imperfect duty. These kinds of duties are often 
concerned with situations of rescue, of providing charity and of showing care and concern 
for others.  
Between justice and virtue 
It seems that it could be fruitful to look further into the concept of duties in general and in 
particular into the concept of imperfect duties. Our exploration of the term so far loosely 
defined as a „sense of responsibility‟ implying „an awareness and concern for the impact and 
the consequences of one‟s own actions and in-actions, for the general well-being of the 
wider society‟ appears to be of such a nature that one can to a certain extent expect this of 
other people; to show a minimum of decency and concern for the interests of people around 
them. Similarly, it seems that no one can demand this as a matter of right. Although no one 
has a right to expect it, it could be considered that human beings living together in a society 
still have a duty of sorts to behave in certain ways or to refrain from behaving in certain 
ways.  
Onora O‟Neill, a Cambridge University professor in philosophy, has argued that many 
liberal accounts of justice nowadays do not give enough importance to imperfect duties. She 
believes that since most liberal writing on justice seeks to maximize the total amount of 
freedom for the individual, anything that is not a factor of the above framework where duties 
correspond to rights is considered merely to be „voluntary action‟ (O‟Neill, 141,142). Such 
voluntary action is, however, often praised by libertarians who mention that a showing of 
concern, which is not a matter of satisfying other‟s rights, displays valuable traits of 
philanthropy and altruism. O‟Neill still believes, however, that imperfect duties are not 
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really taken sufficiently seriously in such accounts. “All that is actually established of such 
action [philanthropy and voluntary action] is that it does not violate rights and that it is 
chosen; the basis for thinking that it is good is never revealed” (Ibid, 143).The conception of 
justice that O‟Neill has in mind here is characterized by being universalist in orientation, 
based on practical reasoning and abstract principles and focused on providing guidance for 
action by showing how certain sorts of action are conditionally required (Ibid, 2,3). Accounts 
of justice have, in other words, a problem in handling duties that are un-conditional, that do 
not belong in the framework of rights and duties, since all other action is placed in the same 
category of personal freedom where one is free to do as one wants – giving charity to the 
homeless or ignoring a child drowning is thus considered equally permissible as long as no 
one‟s rights are being ignored. 
There is, in other words, something lacking which points out that it is good to show concern 
for other people instead of not doing so. If it, on the other hand, can be shown that there are 
certain kinds of action that are in some way important for sustaining civility in society for 
instance and which cannot be said to be matters of justice we might get closer to what we are 
looking for here. 
By looking instead to virtue ethics the full range of ethical action will be available since 
virtue ethics are not based in the framework of rights and duties but instead dependent on the 
specific requirements of particular situations and contexts (Ibid, 137,138). Such a view will 
open up the possibility that there might be important forms of ethical action that might not 
be sufficiently recognized from a perspective of justice (Ibid, 141). But a perspective from 
the vantage point of virtue also has its limitations. Recent accounts of virtue-ethics have 
been particularist in orientation, concerned with what action is required in specific 
relationships and contexts primarily in the narrow settings of community and traditions. Just 
as recent accounts on justice have left little or no room for the practice of virtues, recent 
writers on virtue have been equally opposed to the abstract reasoning and universality which 
proponents of the virtues believe necessarily imply a quasi-mechanical view of human 
beings and a calculative approach to guiding human action (ibid, 123).  
This development is, to O‟Neill, fundamentally the result of a confusion because of an 
insistence on rigidly separating accounts of virtue and justice (Ibid, xi). This tendency to 
separate justice and virtues seems, however, in most part to be a contemporary phenomenon 
since earlier accounts of ethics by, for instance, Locke, Kant and Rousseau worked 
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simultaneously with virtues and with justice (Ibid, 140). O‟Neill therefore believes it is 
possible to find common ground between the two and also believes that they can be mutually 
supporting since both approaches have theirs advantages and disadvantages in guiding 
action.  
According to O‟Neill, the point of ethics and politics is to guide human action in public and 
personal domains. Virtue ethics in this view have their strong point in that they are context-
dependent and situational and as such are able to provide principles that will be readily 
available to agents in everyday lived life (Ibid, 2). Also, virtues make no limitations 
whatsoever in the spectrum of possible action. 
At the same time O‟Neill realizes that abstract reasoning, commonly used in accounts on 
justice is unavoidable for such an endeavour and that it may not have to be as ethically 
damaging as the particularists
51
 claim that it is (Ibid, 2-3). This leads to the conclusion that 
an ethical account based on integrating justice and virtue must (1) be based on practical 
reasoning for making it of practical use in everyday life; (2) it must be able to accommodate 
abstraction as this is unavoidable for any account on action, according to O‟Neill (Ibid, 2) 
and (3) it must furthermore be universalizable since principles must be adoptable by all in 
the relevant domain. If principles cannot be adoptable by all they will not be considered 
reasoned
52
 (Ibid, 125, 126). 
In order to identify what forms of ethical action are sufficiently important O‟Neill bases her 
account on the principle of ethical requirements as basic in order to develop an integrated 
account of justice and virtue. “A constructivist conception of practical reason will identify 
some ethical requirements if it can show that there are principles of action which cannot be 
viewed as adoptable by all53” (O‟Neill, 126). This means that such an account depends on 
the existence of certain principles of action which cannot be universalized, since this would 
imply on the contrary the existence of other principles that do require, prohibit and permit 
certain types of action (Ibid). A requirement is thus to be understood both positively and 
negatively since it can both be the presence and the absence of certain principles that are 
required. If it can be shown that the performance of certain virtues is required then these will 
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in effect have to be adopted and likewise if the rejection of other principles is required, these 
will then have to be rejected. Using a principle based on requirements furthermore will 
transcend accounts of justice and of virtue of „what is just?‟ and „what kind of person should 
I be?‟ by simply stating what is required?  
The immediate advantage of using requirements as the basic principle is, according to 
O‟Neill, its practicality in linking act-types to act-types and agents to agents in definite ways 
(Ibid, 127). What is meant by this is: “act-types that are required will also be permitted and 
their omission will be forbidden” and consequently… “act-types that are forbidden will not 
be permitted and their omission will be required” and finally “act-types that are neither 
required nor forbidden will be merely permissible” (Ibid, 127). Likewise agents are linked 
together in the sense that if A owes B an act (or its omission) of a certain kind then B is 
entitled to its performance (or omission) (Ibid). This means that act-types that are required 
will arise between agents such that there will always be one who acts and one who receives. 
This should not be confused with Hohfeld‟s scheme of correlativity since the connection 
between agents and between acts and agent are only based in requirements, not in right-
claims.  
O‟Neill has observed that most contemporary writing on ethics at this point usually take a 
perspective of recipiency, meaning „from the point of view of those in the receiving end of 
the right-obligations relationship‟, which leads to the guiding question for action, being: 
What am I entitled to? Another perspective, indeed, the complimentary perspective, would 
be from obligations or duties and so a perspective rather on agency, which O‟Neill believes 
would be the more practical perspective. Such a perspective would be defined as: „What 
ought I to do?‟, „How should I live?‟, and „What is to be done?‟ (Ibid,127-128). Viewing 
ethical requirements from the perspective of the agent allows for the full scope of action to 
be available – that is, both action to which there are corresponding rights and action without 
corresponding rights. O‟Neill adds here that it could be considered highly likely that certain 
so called social virtues might fall under the scope of being matters of requirement. 
Integrating an account of virtue and justice based on requirements could then imply that 
there could potentially be certain virtues the performance of which would be considered as 
precisely being a matter of requirement, but which would not have a corresponding right and 
so would not fit into the scheme of  
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corresponding rights and duties. .           
 
This insight may be of great use since the distinction between views based on either 
recipiency or agency can roughly be equated to the two views we have so far been treating. 
The Western world‟s liberal democracies are quite clearly based on viewing rights as 
primary, where rights and duties go together and set the premises for the bounds of required 
ethical action, as has been thoroughly argued for. Furthermore a view of recipiency has 
furthermore certain sociological consequences (as has already been thoroughly stated in the 
first chapter) by prioritizing rights so strongly that the corresponding obligations are not only 
treated secondarily but at times are almost forgotten due to the stronger appeal and rhetoric 
force of rights. Glendon‟s term of the „rights mentality‟ thoroughly analysed and explained 
this phenomenon.  
O‟Neill argues that this rights fixation has the consequence that if the virtue of helpfulness 
would be considered required, it would only be considered „permissible to perform‟ within a 
framework of justice unless there would be developed a corresponding right to friendliness. 
Obviously such a right would be absurd. It would be equally permissible not to be friendly as 
it would be to mean as long as no one‟s rights are violated. If viewed instead from a 
perspective of agency where requirements would be the leading principle O‟Neill points out 
that if the virtue of helpfulness would be required it would be “manifest in a life informed by 
a principle of helping where one can where it is needed, although, by hypothesis, in this case 
nobody would have a right to specific sorts of help form others” (O‟Neill, 139). 
A view from Confucianism, on the other hand, is in this respect not particularly concerned 
with principles of justice as such but rather with acting out in accordance with the virtues 
and in relation to what the specific situation would demand. The prevalence of an extensive 
framework of norms and practices furthermore helps by structuring behaviour between 
agents according to context. Such a view based on virtuousness is also incomplete though, 
since no one can be certain to receive what may be required and what they may be entitled to 
if other people in society do not do what is to be expected of them. As previously argued the 
downside in relying on everyone behaving and acting according to norms and customs is that 
people really have no entitlements and so no way to claiming even the most basic 
necessities. This leaves people very vulnerable as there is no defence against abuse of power 
by those who are privileged if no one possesses any rights.  
  
82 
 
The choice of perspective is, however, rendered easy for O‟Neill since nothing will be lost in 
taking the starting point from the view of obligations. The same cannot be said, as we have 
seen, about a perspective from rights (Ibid, 146). This decision calls for a new framework of 
duties based on what kinds of duties there are and to whom they can or should be directed. 
Apart from the overall categories of perfect and imperfect obligations O‟Neill furthermore 
distinguishes between universal and special obligations. The former is characterized as being 
obligations that everyone can hold and the latter are obligations that grow out of „specific 
roles, institutions, relationships‟ or the like (Ibid, 147).  
Universal perfect duties are obligations owed to everyone
54
. They can only be negative tasks 
of allowing and refraining from doing or prohibiting certain things. These can also be 
institutionalized and always have corresponding rights. They can be made even stronger by 
certain social virtues such as the virtue of solidarity or that of fair play. This means that 
certain „extra rules‟ may cause agents to be more aware of these negative obligations 
towards others. Certain vices may, on the other hand, undermine this, such as cruelty or 
greed (Ibid, 147). O‟Neill does not elaborate further on what is meant with this last part but 
her point seems to be that people can live up to these obligations to a higher or lesser degree 
and the prevalence of certain vices or virtues may either inhibit or encourage this. 
Special perfect duties are dependent on certain social institutions connecting the specified 
agents with the specified recipients; these can be the state, markets, the family, firms and so 
on. Special obligations always presuppose special relationships which can be both 
distributively held such as with welfare rights or rather held for prolonged periods of time 
such as relationships between family members or professional relationships (Ibid, 148). 
These are, in other words, all the corresponding obligations to every different claim and 
welfare right which imply positive action and are the result of special connections between 
agents potentially bypassing certain institutional structures. 
Universal imperfect obligations lack counterpart rights and are both un-claimable and are not 
bound to particular instances. Instead they are rather relative to the character of the specific 
agent. In other words everybody holds these obligations but it is both unclear to whom they 
are owed as well as under which circumstances they should be performed. If these are 
manifest in agents‟ characters they can best be thought of as „a range of specific virtues‟ 
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which O‟Neill calls portable ethical characteristics (Ibid, 148). The merit and value of 
universal imperfect obligations lies exactly in the fact that they are not being enforced and 
that they are not bound to particular contexts. This is so because the merit of people being 
kind or generous would lose their intrinsic value if these virtues were only performed 
because of coercion from law or because a certain context demanded it (Ibid). So the 
dilemma is then that if there are any required virtues of this sort it remains wholly unclear to 
whom and in what situations they should be performed (Ibid, 148). 
Somehow it can appear surprising that the circumstances for performing these obligations 
are so unclearly defined by O‟Neill since if imperfect obligations are truly universal they 
ought as well to be performed whenever a situation appeared where it could be performed. 
This view is, however, mistaken as we have to remind ourselves that no one can demand the 
performance of these. If one was to practise the virtue of friendliness to all and in every 
instance during one‟s life one would have to do so endlessly for the rest of one‟s life. This is 
why O‟Neill points out that these characteristics are rather to be conceptualized as required 
virtues of agents.  
But learning and using these virtues when required is not all there is. Virtues may fade away 
with time when solely dependent on the goodwill of people. O‟Neill emphasizes the 
importance of sustaining these virtues through various institutions and traditions in order for 
these to not fade away. “In recognizing the importance of good character we do not deny, but 
rather affirm, the importance of institutions and traditions which inculcate, transmit and 
sustain virtues as well as congruent support and discipline. The individual and social 
embodiments are mutually supporting” (O‟Neill, 149).  
Special imperfect obligations have by proponents of the virtues often been claimed to exist 
almost exclusively in the various relationships we all engage in. These relations create 
special opportunities for displaying certain virtues such as loyalty between friends, the 
affection of a spouse or the encouragement given by a mother to her child. It is precisely 
because different relationships require different virtues that these virtues are special and not 
universal. O‟Neill believes that the extent of and also the kind of virtues every person 
masters is largely a consequence of how one have come to live one‟s life. If one is used to 
being among many people, one may lack skills of intimacy and the special attention required 
for intimate sympathy but on the other hand possess great skills of solidarity and equality 
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which may be what those who live more private lives may lack in exchange for greater skills 
of empathy and attentive care (Ibid, 150). 
O‟Neill illustrates how the different categories of duty may apply in the relationship between 
parents and their child. Parents may first of all have an obligation in not physically harming 
their child in any way - just as parents may not harm any other people since they have rights 
that protect them from this abuse. These are the universal perfect obligations. Parents also 
have certain obligations that apply specifically to them in virtue of them being in a special 
relationship with the child. These involve obligations of care and support to make sure that 
the child is healthy, fed and other physical needs are met. These are the special perfect 
obligations. Most parents will also believe that they should show a certain amount of 
courtesy and respect – just as they should to everybody else. Neither their child nor anyone 
else can claim this as a matter of right but most people will consider it obligatory to show 
such minimal amount of respect and decency to other people. These are the imperfect 
universal obligations. Good parents may also believe that they owe their child certain sorts 
of love, attention and care although they are in no way obliged to do this. Once again the 
child has no right to any of this either but it will generally be expected of parents to show 
this extra care and concern for their child. These are the special imperfect obligations 
(O‟Neill, 151). 
O‟Neill emphasizes that most human relationships consist of both imperfect and perfect 
obligations and that both are equally expected even though only the latter kind can actually 
be claimed (Ibid, 151-152). In other words people are usually in the situation that they both 
have to act on certain occasions in certain contexts but that they also ought to act on other 
occasions and these two go hand in hand (Ibid). 
This leads to a new framework of ethical action based on obligations: 
 
Perfect obligations: 
- Universal: Held by all, owed to all; counterparts to liberty rights55; embodied above 
all in legal and economic systems.  
- Special: Held by some; owed to specified others; counterpart special rights; fixed by 
structure of specific transactions and relationships; can be distributively universal 
given appropriate institutions. 
                                                          
55
 O‟Neill deviates here from Hohfeld by attaching a duty of negative liberty to non-interference with anyone‟s 
liberty rights.  
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Imperfect obligations: 
- Universal: Held by all, owed to none; no counterpart rights; embodied above all in 
character and expressed in varied situations. 
- Special: Held by some, owed to none; no counterpart rights; embodied in ethos of 
specific relationships and practices and in characters; often, but not exclusively, 
expressed in action within special relationships (Ibid, 152).
56
 
 
According to Confucian thought most, if not all, of these obligations would be considered an 
integral part of performing ren „humaneness‟. There would be no distinction between perfect 
and imperfect obligations; if you have an obligation it is to be performed regardless of who 
would be in the receiving end. There would also be special demands for performing certain 
obligations in certain roles that are specifically connected to this particular relationship. 
These would belong in the category of imperfect special obligations. In contrast to the West 
the need for sustaining people‟s characters on a continuous basis is recognized in 
Confucianism and for this purpose the rites provide as institutionalized practices that help 
sustain the integrity of the virtues, avoiding that they become perverted by conflicting 
impulses or desires. O‟Neill argued along similar lines by emphasising the important role 
that institutions and traditions play in maintaining and nurturing people‟s characters, which 
serves as further evidence to both the conclusions of especially Etzioni but also to those of 
Glendon by demonstrating how communities although not exclusively have the capacity to 
sustain a moral climate.  
In this new framework of obligations certain things become clearer. The category of perfect 
obligations are all owed and as such are not a matter of virtue (although as argued, certain 
virtues can enhance motivation for carrying certain obligations) whereas the imperfect 
obligations which are not owed are specifically matters of virtue ethics. This prompts 
O‟Neill to take the next step and argue that justice is to be considered a matter of perfect 
rights and obligations and that virtue depends on the framework of imperfect obligations that 
necessarily must be without counterpart rights.  
“Justice is a matter of perfect obligation, matched by rights; its demands fall on 
all, and are owed to all. Required virtues, if there are any, will also make 
demands that fall on all, but will not specify recipients and occasions for virtuous 
                                                          
56
 This framework is different from O’Neill’s as it categorized by using ‘perfect’ and ‘imperfect’ obligations as 
the main labels instead ‘universal’ and ‘special’ obligations which O’Neill prefers. I believe that the 
significance of the framework is on difference between perfect and imperfect obligations. 
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action. Even when required of all, virtuous action can, indeed must, be no more 
and no less than a matter of imperfect obligation…” (Ibid, 184).  
 
I realize that these definitions of justice and virtue would require further qualification to be 
justified and vindicated. This is however an endeavour that I not will undertake here since I 
believe it un-controversial to state as a minimum that imperfect obligations of any kind are 
treated secondarily after perfect obligations with corresponding rights. The performance of 
obligations to which others carry corresponding rights must in general be considered more 
important than the obligations that do not have any corresponding rights. This reason for 
creating corresponding rights must signify a presumed necessity in the obligations being 
performed
57
.  
I believe it safe to conclude that our concept of a sense of responsibility does not belong 
within the realm of justice but is rather to be conceived of as what O‟Neill describes as a 
portable ethical characteristic and hence as an imperfect obligation. As discussed in the first 
chapter if your performing a duty is purely because it is legally required it cannot be 
considered to be moral action
58. In speaking of the requirement of having „a sense of 
responsibility‟ is implied an internal state of mind characterized as a certain skill based on 
normative judgements on how to coordinate one‟s behaviour according to external 
circumstances. This means in effect that I will bypass the discussion on identifying possible 
principles of ethical requirements within the domain of justice and instead move on to 
directly locating principles within the domain of the virtues
59
. 
Responsibility as the rejection of indifference 
If there are to be any such principles of required virtues O‟Neill affirms that they would have 
to be inclusive principles in order to be able to direct people in all situations and spheres of 
life (O‟Neill, 185). If such a principle would not be inclusive it would be no more than a 
characteristic trait or a sign of excellence in some particular instantiation (Ibid, 185). If it is 
to count as a general principle it must be able to apply universally, as it was, and has to be 
able to direct human beings in their course of life. O‟Neill‟s conception of justice is based on 
                                                          
57
I will however not disregard the possibility of occasions where the performance of an imperfect duty might 
be fundamentally more important than to perform a perfect duty i.e ignoring people’s rights in preventing a 
bomb from exploding in a market full of people. 
58
 Pg ¿?? 
59
 I am aware of the possibility of there being other variants of responsibilities that might be a matter of 
justice such as David Miller’s concept of remedial responsibility where he discusses the possibility of holding 
nations responsible for past injustices done to other nations in “National responsibility and global justice” 
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a principle of avoiding the infliction of injury on people, which she defends in the preceding 
chapter #6 Principles for all: Towards justice. O‟Neill explains her conception of justice as 
follows: “…principles of justice are a matter of rejecting principled injury, but considered 
more concretely justice is a matter of constructing, maintaining and living with and through 
specific institutions which limit injury, in part by defining special rights and obligations and 
procedures for constructing further special rights and obligations (for example by promises, 
by contract, through market relations, by administrative procedures) and so can help achieve 
a degree of political, economic, social and environmental security for all” (O‟Neill, 191). 
O‟Neill‟s conception of justice is specifically directed towards caring for pluralities60 rather 
than individuals which means that the subjects of justice are largely „anonymous individuals‟ 
who have certain political, economic and social rights which are to be fulfilled. This 
contrasts well with the view from the „particularists‟ who have criticized accounts of justice 
for viewing human beings rather mechanically as a plurality of „straw men‟. It could, 
however, be disputed that basing an account only on principles of injury is somewhat narrow 
in scope. A different principle such as the principle of doing harm would be farther reaching 
but a principle of doing harm would on the other hand obscure O‟Neill‟s basic argument 
which can explain choosing injury as the basic principle of justice. „Harm‟ has a potentially 
wider scope than injury since there are more ways of harming a person than injuring them. 
Whereas injury is usually is an external phenomenon harm can also be internal, such as 
emotional harm.  
 
O‟Neill believes that the basic problem is that justice treats people rather as pluralities than 
as sentient human beings. To O‟Neill, justice fails in neglecting to recognize the human 
condition as one being determined by human beings being linked to other human beings in 
specific ways that create specific dependencies and specific vulnerabilities. Living together 
with other people in society human lives also become irreducibly lives that are dependent on 
more than other people abstaining from causing injury to each other. O‟Neill illustrates this 
by the consideration that living in a world where there would only be justice
61
 would not be 
fulfilling for any human being since our relations with other people are not merely based on 
abiding to a principle of non-injury (Ibid, 193). O‟Neill‟s basic claim is that we are 
                                                          
60
 I understand pluralities as ‘the sum of individuals’ who are basically all the same and have the same needs in 
virtue of all being human beings. 
61
 ‘justice’ again understood as a principle of rejecting injury. 
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vulnerable beyond what principles of justice demand (Ibid). Being vulnerable, people 
become connected with other people and with institutions that have the capacities to find 
reliefs for these vulnerabilities. This creates in effect dependencies on these agents and 
institutions on which we depend, which again make us vulnerable since being dependent is 
being vulnerable. Even the very institutions whose sole purpose it is to serve and provide as 
benefits for people at the same time create new dependencies and thus render us vulnerable:  
“The social fabric that creates capabilities which strengthen and protect also 
creates further vulnerabilities; the natural and man-made systems which sustain 
lives also render them dependent, often asymmetrically dependent. Affections 
engaged both secure others’ support and  expose to cruelty and rejection; 
dependence on the action of particular officials both secures support and 
exposes to the results of their corruption or inefficiency; marriage and family ties 
both support and demand; food aid that supplements subsistence agriculture 
and local markets both improves nutrition and creates dependence on suppliers. 
Connected lives become selectively, variably and sometimes acutely vulnerable 
lives” (Ibid, 192). 
 
The relationship between vulnerability, security and dependency is circular in the sense that 
it is the continuity of being vulnerable and dependent and how connections are created 
between agents and agents and between agents and institutions that is crucial to O‟Neill. 
Once such a relation is established there is a specific connection which places a 
responsibility on either one of the parts or on both parts to respect this status as being a 
viable necessity for the other part.  
 
I find it doubtful, however, that O‟Neill wants to claim that institutionalized negligence (or 
negligence from public officials) is not a matter of justice. If a public official does not 
provide the service or the goods that a person is entitled to receive this would to me be 
considered a matter of injustice (but not necessarily to O‟Neill given her principle of 
rejecting injury as constituting justice). The creation of a relationship based on dependence 
between institutions and people means that institutions are continuously obliged to provide a 
given service or good since not doing so would in many instances be a case of causing injury 
to people. The mere creation of a certain institution with a given purpose in regard to helping 
sustain people in a certain way is not enough. If the institution does not fulfil its duties 
competently it creates injustices to the people dependent on the concrete service or good it is 
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supposed to supply. This is also a matter of perfect rights and duties and so must be a matter 
of justice. 
 
On the other hand I believe that O‟Neill is right on an interpersonal level. If civic life 
depended purely on matters of justice it would in theory be possible to live a life where one 
would be able to disregard and to ignore other people as a matter of principle. Living a life in 
which one is concerned only with oneself is not unjust but it can, O‟Neill believes, be 
formulated into a principle the adoption of which cannot be willed or universalized. Such a 
principle would imply that inclusive principles of indifference to and neglect of others 
cannot be universalized (O‟Neill, 193).  
 
In order to not misunderstand O‟Neill it is important to underline here that O‟Neill is talking 
about making indifference and neglect a guiding principle of one‟s life. This is important 
since O‟Neill herself remarks that „we are naturally bound to be indifferent and neglectful to 
many people in our everyday lives‟. We cannot possibly fit everyone within our sphere of 
ethical concern. But making it a leading principle of our lives to be indifferent and to neglect 
others would imply that we would never, as a matter of principle, take the wellbeing of 
others into consideration, again, unless we would be forced to do so as the result of having to 
respect the rights of others. Making such an attitude a leading principle of one‟s life would 
naturally have devastating consequences for the cohesion of civic life. The universalization 
of such a principle can therefore not be adopted. O‟Neill defends this by arguing:  
“Indifference and neglect are not unjust. Nobody can avoid being indifferent to 
and neglecting many, if not most, others to whom they are connected. 
Nevertheless justice is not enough. Those who make indifference or neglect an 
inclusive principle are committed not to help or to care for any others within the 
domain of ethical consideration to which they are committed. They could think 
of their principles of indifference and neglect as universalizable, only if 
indifference and neglect could be inclusive principles for all. Yet no vulnerable 
agent can coherently accept that indifference and neglect should be 
universalized, for if they were nobody could rely on others’ help; joint projects 
would tend to fail; vulnerable characters would be undermined; capacities and 
capabilities that need assistance and nurturing would not emerge; personal 
relationships would wither; education and cultural life would decline. It follows 
that those with plans and projects, even of the most minimal sort, cannot regard 
indifference and neglect as universalizable” (O’Neill, 194). 
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For O‟Neill, the rejection of indifference is understood as an absolute requirement in 
upholding a minimum of civility in society. The merit of this principle is exactly that being 
indifferent and neglectful is not a matter of (O‟Neillian) justice and so not a matter of 
respecting other people‟s rights. There is nothing that prevents people from going through 
life without ever so much as having a thought about the well-being of any other person in the 
world than one-self. O‟Neill stated it fittingly as: “Nothing shows why indifference or self-
centeredness should not be life-projects for liberals, providing, of course, that others' rights 
are respected; and no doubt they often are” (O'Neill, p. 144). 
There is reason to think that the adoption of a principle of rejecting indifference and neglect 
might help to fill in this „moral gap‟ in Western society that we characterised earlier on as 
having „a sense of responsibility‟ i.e. an awareness and a consideration of the impact of 
one‟s actions and in-actions on the well-being of other people. Certain things need 
qualification though and at least two central questions require answering:  
 
(1) If we are to reject indifference how is it determined to whom we should reject being 
indifferent? What is the scope of such a principle in other words? 
(2) How demanding would such a principle of rejecting indifference be? Should we at 
one extreme make other‟s problems, our problems, or, at another extreme, merely 
sympathize with people and show that we are at least not indifferent?   
 
(I will not answer these questions directly but rather use them as guides for the discussion of 
this principle.) 
 
The scope of the principle  
The first worry of such a principle is the classical critique given by consequentialists to the 
proponents of virtue ethics. The principle of the rejection of indifference risks so to say 
„falling into an abyss of indifference‟ since if one must necessarily be indifferent to some 
and one thereby has to choose who not to be indifferent to we are left with a rather weak 
principle that does not really provide any guidance whatsoever.  
O'Neill offers however a substantial reply to this obvious worry. Since this kind of action is 
always directed at other people although to whom and when is unclear O‟Neill affirms that it 
must be the category of social virtues that is under question as what action kinds of action 
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this principle would demand.  
“The social virtues make selective demands: they leave open to whom, or when 
or in what ways virtue is to be expressed. They do not require generalized or 
maximal benevolence or beneficence, or any set amount of either, but only 
selective and feasible help, care, love, generosity, support or solidarity” (Ibid, 
195).  
 
Since there must always be someone to whom one could show such concern O‟Neill argues 
that many of the relationships we interact in everyday stand as particularly appealing 
instances for expressing many of the social virtues. Certain relationships are sustained over 
long periods of time and develop into valuable resources for friendship and support, love and 
concern. This means, however, that these heighten vulnerability precisely because people 
come to depend heavily on each other (Ibid, 196). O‟Neill describes that these relationships 
“provide organizing structures for sustained love, care and solidarity” (Ibid, 196).  
“When occasion and recipients of actions are not fully defined, principles have to 
be embedded in more flexible ways. This is the basic reason why certain social 
virtues are better embodied in the characters of agents, in the ethos of 
institutions and in social practices and traditions, as ‘portable’, or at least ‘semi-
portable’, ethical attitudes and characteristics, rather than in structures that 
define precise claims between agents and recipients.  
The rejection of indifference and neglect is therefore properly expressed not 
only by the formation of appropriate characters but also in part through the 
construction and cultivation of special relationships which normally channel and 
focus certain social virtues” (Ibid, 196-197). 
 
From this quote can be drawn several parallels with what, according to Confucian thought, 
was considered required for „making people act humanely‟. Respecting one‟s roles and 
duties in relationships and the rites that defined them was not just a way of doing what was 
required to act humanly but was similarly a way of learning how to behave by being familiar 
with the virtues so they in time would become internalized and be an integral part of one‟s 
character. O‟Neill‟s emphasis on „the ethos of institutions, social practices and traditions‟ 
gives additional heed to the function and purpose of performing the rites as well as to the 
basic idea of communities as means to reminding people of rejecting indifference.  
Relationships 
The contents of the rites and the roles that define the Confucian relationships might be 
thought of as guiding principles – as variations of the principle of rejecting indifference that 
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define specific tasks that help express certain virtues. Providing specific guidance as to how 
to relate to one‟s parents, friends and the elderly would in this context provide a continuous 
lesson for everybody not to be indifferent and negligent to others. The ritualization of 
relating means on the one hand less freedom to act as you want but on the other that people 
become accustomed to at least not ignoring one another. For the Confucians the thought was 
additionally that keeping to such structured ways of acting would be an important ingredient 
for keeping society harmonious. 
Relating and building relationships is, however, not a Confucian invention and people in 
Western society and people in general have equally strong and benefitting relations.  People 
are so also rendered equally vulnerable due to their emotional involvement herein. The 
difference between the Confucian variant and the Western one is therefore merely the 
ascription and establishment of norms indicating who has to do what for whom? While such 
strict and non-chosen duties and demands may not be accepted in Western society one could 
have the thought that if you add, as a principle, the rejection of indifference and ignorance as 
a basic requirement for how we should behave to the people with whom you partake in 
relationships there would be an actual requirement (or a duty or a responsibility) for not 
being indifferent. The ways in which one would want to show one‟s „non-indifference‟ 
would be up to the individual. As Rosemont noticed “there are many ways of being a 
teacher, spouse, sibling, friend (Rosemont, 2004, 64). Attaching a principle of rejecting 
indifference when one is dealing with people in various ways could help to generate 
increased sensitivity and concern to others. If people consider the emotional cost of 
neglecting people close to them, by being disloyal, deceitful or just emotionally or physically 
absent one‟s awareness of the emotional destruction a person can bring about in this way 
could be heightened.  
One could however easily imagine that some people would not be as appreciative as they 
could of being shown consideration but might take advantage of this concern and use it to 
exploit the generous giver. Such situations where some people exploit the good intentions 
and goodwill of others are, however, not problematic and actually shows how a principle of 
rejecting indifference would have an advantage over the Confucian counterpart of ascribing 
mutual duties. Rejecting indifference does not imply neither catering for anyone, nor 
showing unconditional concern, love and support for other people. Rejecting indifference 
does not imply, making endless sacrifices for others. If others do not treat you with a 
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minimum of dignity or care you can first try and correct the other in various ways and if that 
does not change I believe one could add to the principle a balancing device including a 
„minimal of reciprocity‟. Expecting reciprocity would, however, not imply a calculative 
„something-for-something‟ system of exchange. If rejecting indifference in confronting a 
homeless person the minimal reciprocation to expect would be gratitude since a homeless in 
virtue of being more or less deprived would have little to offer back. Gratitude is, however, 
free for everyone. If your showing consideration for others is wholly un-appreciated and in 
contrast is exploited there might be reason to believe that your non-indifference would be 
better spent elsewhere. 
This does not, however, solve the problem of defining the scope since, as it was, we cannot 
avoid being indifferent to many people every day and if the relationships we interact in 
already provide as the sole guidance as to who we should reject indifference, O‟Neill‟s 
account might run into the same trouble as Confucianism. As discussed on pgs. 47-49 and 
pg. 66 respectively, the focus on relationships and Confucius‟ thoughts on „graduated love‟ 
unfortunately resulted in widespread nepotism and parochialism.  
Guidance in how to act in a relationship still does not help in pointing out who to enter into 
such a relationship with (unless you are already in such a relationship) and how far you 
should be willing to show concern and care for others. Realizing the state of the world there 
is more than enough destitution and misery that would be in desperate need for people 
rejecting to be indifferent.  
Without investigating various routes based on consequentialist and deontologist  parameters 
for defining and focusing the scope I will at this point agree with O‟Neill that there simply is 
no easy way of finding out exactly who not to be indifferent to and that it might as well be 
wrong to assume that all ethical action should provide specific guidelines. I believe that the 
principle of rejecting indifference is not one that requires complete guidance. In this respect I 
believe O‟Neill has a good point when she states that “not everything that is left 
undetermined need be arbitrary in any worrying sense” (Ibid, 198). O‟Neill also emphasised 
that since people live different lives some will develop virtues of a certain kind of direction 
and others being differently disposed will have tendencies to develop virtues that are 
different in kind and offer other ways of being indifferent to people
62
. This suggests that 
perhaps by looking inward for moral guidance by strengthening the virtues required for 
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 O’Neill reminds us of this on pgs 83-84. 
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rejecting indifference might be more appealing than outward guidance that does not 
recognize how personalities can differ.  This makes sense in the light of the earlier 
importance placed on cultivation of character.  
Character 
O‟Neill also suggests that social virtues, given their non-specificity and lack of concrete 
instantiations, could be regarded rather as features of peoples‟ character; a certain trait of 
personality that will be explicated in situations where it would seem to be required. These 
two proposals for guidance might even be mutually benefitting:  
In Confucianism, relating with other people is considered to be education; learning as 
cultivating and sharpening the virtues and so also one‟s character. The merit of Confucian 
learning is to inspire people into, as it was, „behaving as human beings‟, which means 
knowing the five Confucian virtues and making the practice of these. Filial piety was 
considered the most basic virtue but still a very important virtue because it would be the first 
lesson in life towards learning to become human. Filial piety could in today‟s world be 
translated into „learning to respect‟ and could in similar terms be considered the important 
first lesson for any person to learn. Respect similarly teaches you humbleness, etiquette, 
modesty and consideration. Such virtues can be considered the very building blocks of 
learning how to relate to others and so also the beginning of a long line of lessons of 
building a robust character that is capable of moral consideration. What I want to argue is 
along the same lines as Lee‟s point on pgs. 69-70, that learning the virtues can itself be 
considered a way to enhance sensitivity to the needs and interests of others and can imply 
that people will become increasingly adept in considering what their relation to other people 
should be on a wider scale. Indulging in learning that would build one‟s character would in 
consequence result in a more stable foundation for deciding when to and when not to be 
indifferent to others, by letting the interests and needs of others gain significant room in 
one‟s moral judgements in balance with one‟s own capacities helping others by rejecting 
indifference. 
O‟Neill is also aware of, like the Confucians were, the important role that institutions, social 
practise and traditions play in keeping people‟s moral sentiments at bay. On page 83 now!!! 
she could easily speak both on behalf of Confucius (and many other Confucians) and of 
Etzioni in underlining the importance of these external mechanisms for sustaining the moral 
sentiments in people. The possibility of introducing the concept of rites into the Western 
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society was suggested earlier as a possibility to keep people‟s desires and personal interests 
(or rights-mentality) focused on what matters
63
.  
There is reason to believe that O‟Neill is not interested in promoting a principle that gives 
strict and easy to follow guidance by defining the scope of the principle completely. O‟Neill 
seems to be careful in not qualifying the principle very concretely as that would probably 
make it too similar to already existing principles such as the harm principles and utilitarian 
principles. This is further illustrated in the extensive quote below where she considers how 
the rejection of indifference would take a less direct form than it does in human 
relationships. O‟Neill considers as well the concept of social trust which is to say all the 
ways in which we interact in cultural, institutional, professional and other social settings 
(Ibid, 202). 
 “The fabric of feeling, culture and convention which sustains trust and 
communication is always fragile and vulnerable. It not only has to be preserved 
from damage and destruction, but to be shielded from mere indifference or 
neglect. It has constantly to be created and sustained, recreated and renewed, 
to preserve ‘the food for future generations’; and of the present generation. 
That food will be reduced, and capacities and capabilities will fail at least for 
some, when nobody maintains and contributes to sustainable practices of 
communication, of toleration and confidence-building, of loyalty and 
engagement, of educating and encouraging, that will enable action, interaction 
and the development of human potential and culture. The social conditions for 
human life and interaction can be sustained and supported among connected 
agents only by attitudes and action that educate new generations, that develop 
individual characters and their capabilities and that foster and seek to improve 
civilizing institutions” (Ibid, 202).  
 
This quote indicates rather an idea of the cumulative efforts of people to keep society 
together, to keep it decent, with an atmosphere of civility, of respect and helpfulness. It is 
here rendered even more undetermined how and to whom one should reject indifference. It 
seems rather as being a background principle or a voice in the back of one‟s mind that 
reminds one not to be indifferent to what O‟Neill fittingly terms the social fabric. 
Understood as such a principle of rejecting indifference can only be considered an internal 
trait of character or a learned skill or ability of some kind. 
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 It goes without saying that rites can be perceived as quite anti-democratic and many practices will of course 
be ill-suited to such ritualization and will require the active participation and a plurality of opinions and 
views. But as noted other practices might not suffer from be equipped with its own set of norms that people 
will have to follow regardless. 
  
96 
 
I would like to suggest that this principle could be strengthened without, however, stripping 
it of its supposedly intended ambiguity by changing its structure from being a principle of 
rejection to one of adoption. Also it would provide additional guidance to the principle. 
Rejecting a principle of indifference and neglect is at the same time rejecting/refusing „not to 
be concerned with other people around you‟. If these negations were removed and the 
principle was stated positively it would imply a principle of showing consideration to some 
other people to a certain extent. Stated differently: if we accept that living by a principle of 
indifference is unacceptable, we say at the same time that one has sometimes to show some 
concern for other people to a given extent. To what extent this would be or to whom exactly 
is still unclear and open-ended. The reason why a principle of indifference could not be 
universalized was because of the human condition of being persistently vulnerable beings. 
But the principle leaves it unclear you would merely have to react only when confronted 
with a person that for one reason or another would prompt you to show concern or if the 
principle should also count when acting or not acting under different circumstances. This 
would imply that one could be indifferent  in one instance (because we cannot show 
consideration for all) where one perhaps would rob someone of all his possessions, then 
come back an hour later and seem morally honourable by rejecting the principle of 
indifference by helping the person out in some way. The only way such a principle would 
make sense would be to connect it to actions (which seemed also to be O‟Neill‟s intention 
(pg. 80) so that in addition to rejecting a principle of being in-different to some, you would 
have in addition to consider the impact of your actions and in-actions so as not to actively 
create a new vulnerability or enhancing an already existing vulnerability which would 
exactly require the rejection of indifference
64
.  
By doing this reformulation and adding to it the importance of showing consideration when 
acting brings us a principle that is remarkably similar to the term that we started out with, 
formulated as „a sense of responsibility‟ defined as „an awareness and concern for the impact 
and the consequences of one‟s own actions and in-actions, for the general well-being of the 
wider society‟ (pg. 16). I realize that this addition will be in need of further qualification and 
will present new challenges for application and scope. Space does not allow for this 
unfortunately and I will there and so I will end the discussion with this last observation. 
                                                          
64
 I take it to be in the spirit of O’Neill’s work that she would not opt for a scenario such as the before 
mentioned and so would reject that it would be consistent to reject indifference on the one side but on the 
other actively contributing to occasions where it would be required. 
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Conclusion 
Rosemont‟s earlier quote: “99 per cent of the time I can fully respect your civil and political 
rights merely by ignoring you” (Rosemont, 2004 p. 59) is in the light of the discussion of the 
rejection of principles of indifference and neglect an insightful contrast to the reality of 
Western society. The appraisal of individual freedom for everyone and the reluctance in 
telling people what to do has become a reluctance to place any kind of merit on action. When 
you are in the sphere of what is permissible (i.e. making drawings in your home that you 
know will insult and offend a millions of people around the world or doing good deeds that 
make other people happy and grateful to you) there is virtually nothing that indicates that 
one kind of action is morally better than the other – except, that is, for your own conscience. 
That consciences come in different forms and can be influenced, for better or for worse, 
through teaching and training is a basic intuition of Confucian morality and rendered, as a 
consequence, this insight  a guiding principle for the norms, customs and institutions of 
society. As argued, the effect to which it worked out in practise is unclear, which has made 
the issue of Confucianism a highly controversial one today. What is less controversial 
however is that the inherent in-equality and the rigidity and restrictions of behaviour would 
in their original form not be well-received by the liberal and free-minded spirit of Western 
society. 
I think, however, in line with O‟Neill that there could be a way in between the two 
contrasting views. People can and should have rights that secure an existential base for living 
a decent life and safeguarding every human being against being oppressed and over-ruled by 
the majority. At the same time it should be expected that people take a minimum of concern 
towards others and towards society as a whole. To include the existence of other people 
when acting and to show a minimum of interest and care to sustain an ethos of civility, 
mutual respect and helpfulness in society. Living in a society is an irreducibly shared and 
connected life that is only sustained by the will of the plurality of people, which implies also 
the realization that participating in society is a way of shaping society and also a way of 
shaping people. The presence of other people will always provide as a limitation for 
individual freedom, just as they are absolutely necessary for the substance and enjoyment of 
life 
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If people can agree in general that having rights is what gives a human being his basic 
decency and security in being recognized as a human being it should similarly be agreed that 
the only decent way for people to live in a society with other people is to live by rejecting a 
principle of indifference and negligence for the impact of one‟s actions and in-actions on 
other people.   
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Appendix: 
 
1.0 Illustration of ‘a rite’: 
In a recent publication called “China‟s new Confucianism” Daniel A. Bell brings an 
illuminating illustration of the actual practise and purpose of performing one particular rite. 
Bell speaks primarily of Xunzi‟s conception of the rites which he finds particularly 
appealing. For Xunzi the primary purpose of rites was their ability to cultivate emotions in 
performing certain everyday activities in order to make people be more emotionally present 
in certain ordeals that involve socialization. Additionally, Xunzi believed that in order for 
the rituals to work it was important that everyone, those in high ranks and the subordinates 
alike, felt that they gained something in indulging to perform because it was very important 
that the rituals were not being coerced on people since that would remove the aspect of 
genuineness and authenticity (Bell, 2008, 43). According to Xunzi, the purpose of the rites 
was to civilize in the most basic sense of the word: “hierarchical rituals have the effect of 
civilizing – making civil – hierarchical social interaction that would otherwise expose the 
nasty underside of human beings and be particularly problematic for the weak and 
vulnerable” (Ibid, 46). Teaching concern and care for those inferior to yourself was 
undertaken in the ritual of showing filial piety to the deceased.  
A dead person should be mourned for at least 24 months according to the rites although in 
time it should be phased out smoothly so as to make the transition to everyday life as smooth 
as possible (Ibid, 41). It was, however, important to put a specific end date for when the 
mourning should stop in order to prepare the mourners consciously for a return to their 
everyday life and routines (Ibid). The body should be kept close to village and the family, 
but not too close as the body in time naturally becomes hideous and would obstruct the 
ritual. Little by little the body should be removed further and further away in order to 
gradually remind people of the needs of the living. This also gave time to people from afar to 
arrive and partake in at least part of the mourning process. Xunzi‟s thoughts behind this 
particular set of rituals were, apart from that they helped people through the process in the 
best way emotionally, an actual exercise of learning to show consideration and respect to 
those worst of in society – in this this case the dead. This prolonged period of concern, and 
respect given to the deceased would make one more considerate to those in need in society 
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by cultivating the emotions of respect and care for the needy and the under-privileged (Ibid, 
44). Additionally, Bell explains that the social nature of rites had the effect of mixing high 
and low, young and old, rich and poor to let these meet and so be reminded of the persistent 
humanity in each other and thereby cultivate sensibilities and concern for each other (Ibid). 
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1.1 The Three Confucian Ultimates 
The following is written in order to give an idea of the metaphysical framework that 
Confucianism works within. Although it is quasi-religious and admittedly only touches the 
surface of it, it does however provide a sketch of main metaphysical terms in Confucianism. 
According to Confucianism the world is made up of three elements: heaven (tian)65 , earth 
(di) and humans (ren). Heaven and the earth supply the physical and the meta-physical world 
in which the humans live. The three elements all work together in an organic cosmos and 
their relationships are based on harmony (Yao, 139). Heaven provides the spiritual 
dimension for humans and the relation between heaven and humans is considered to be a 
unity and the product of this unity is ongoing harmony (Yao,141). Heaven as a concept goes 
a lot further than what this study allows for but the following excerpt from Yao's brilliant 
description will give an idea of the significance Heaven has for Confucians:  
“Heaven is not only the creator of life, the supreme governor of the universe, but 
also a just administrator of human affairs. Heaven is revered not for the 
deliverance rewarded to those who have prayed for it. Rather, Heaven is revered 
and respected with awe in the sense that Heaven is regarded as the final 
sanction of human behaviour and social changes. For a fixed period, human 
efforts may succeed or fail, a particular action may or may not be justified, and 
the character of an individual may or may not be recognised. However, with faith 
in heaven in which the final sanction is upheld, the failure of a particular person 
at a particular time does not frustrate a Confucian to the extent that he 
abandons his goals. Wrongdoing and violation of moral principles which for the 
time being cannot be corrected and punished are believed to be eventually 
corrected and punished by Heaven which is closely 'watching' and passionately 
with the world below. It is therefore regarded as the most serious crime to 
offend Heaven or to violate the Way of Heaven” (Yao, 145,146). 
 
The descriptions of Heaven, earth and humans are vast and so are their intricate relationships 
since one thing that is continuously underlined throughout Yao's descriptions is the 
interrelationships between especially Heaven and humans. What characterizes this 
relationship is the concept of The Way (dao) which is what 'must be found' in order to 
sustain harmony in the world. “The Way is the foundation of a harmonious universe, a 
                                                          
65 Yao points out that heaven is not to be mistaken with the meaning it carries in the English language. There 
has been and still is immense debate on what heaven actually is or could be said to be. The word tian 
however refers to a 'supreme ultimate' (Yao, 141) 
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peaceful society and a good life, and without it the transformation of the universe would 
break down, human society would fall into chaos, and the state would weaken and collapse” 
(Yao, 140). Understood as such there exists both a universal Way which is largely 
predetermined and outside the control of humans, and also a Way for individuals which they 
must follow in daily life. This Way however is not one that lies paved before everyone. It 
must be found and then be kept and use it to navigating through life. How humans follow 
and cultivate the Way will then determine their destiny. The inseparableness of humans 
(humanity) and Heaven is better understood when one understands that all ethical principles 
in Confucianism are derived from Heaven and „is the supreme sanction of human behaviour‟ 
(Yao, 142). This also means that the perfection of human virtues is being given an almost 
spiritual side (ibid). 
 
Yet another key term in this regard is that of Harmony (he). To understand harmony one 
must first understand the intricate relation between Heaven and humans and that these two 
are mutually correlative; of the metaphysical and the physical; between form and matter; 
between mind and body and between the one (the universal) and the many (particular) (ibid). 
Harmony is to be understood as the culmination of these and resembles the mark where the 
relation between these become symbiotic and reaches equilibrium (Yao). As with the Way, 
harmony exists both on the micro and macro level such that there is the harmony of the 
world, of society, of the family and inside oneself. But harmony is not to be understood as 
merely 'an instance' - of something that just happens. Reaching harmony on any level 
requires cultivation of the constituents of harmony, meaning that if an individual wants to 
reach harmony he must cultivate his emotions. Again a longer excerpt using the words of 
Yao seems to explain the concept better:  
“To realise harmony within and without, individuals are required to play an 
active, creative role in recasting and reshaping their life, to improve their 
understanding of the world and to manifest their own nature. Harmony as the 
highest ideal is thus closely related to nature, politics, ethics and daily life. In this 
sense it is sometimes addressed as the 'Central Harmony' (zonghe). By 'central 
harmony' Confucians mean that harmony is central to all existence and all 
activities and is rooted in the innate centrality and equilibrium” (Yao, 172). 
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In short it seems difficult to overestimate the importance the concepts of especially Heaven, 
the Way and harmony play in Confucianism. Especially the Way and Heaven are concepts 
that penetrate all spheres of life in Confucianism from the individual moral capacities and 
the striving for higher ideals to the ruler's double responsibilities by himself having to be of 
sufficient moral integrity and at the same time having to provide the people with a 
stimulating society that promotes virtuous growth rather than decay (Yao).  
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